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model, adjusting the staffing window, and prioritizing the staffing of the statistically 
significant unit groups identified in this study. The Marine Corps can improve the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The personnel management system should seek to achieve personnel 
stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering cohesion, 
teamwork, and implicit understanding.” 
—MCDP-1, Warfighting 
(Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997, p. 64) 
 
A. PURPOSE 
It has been said that the United States Marine Corps is a “force in readiness” able 
to deploy to “any clime or place” and is expected “to respond quickly and to win” 
(Commandant of the Marine Corps [CMC], 2015, p. 1). While these statements are true, 
to ensure that the Marine Corps continues to deliver it is critical to carefully cross-
examine and improve the processes that contribute to readiness. General Joseph Dunford, 
the 36th commandant of the Marine Corps, also stated, “Everything we do must 
contribute to our combat readiness and our combat effectiveness” (Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, 2015, p. 4). 
Two significant factors that contribute to Marine Corps readiness are force 
planning and personnel management policies. In 2011, the Marine Corps released a new 
policy to reinforce the concept of stabilizing units before and after their deployments 
rotations. This new policy, specified requirements to commanders and manpower 
planners intended to improve the readiness of the force. The purpose of this research is to 
examine the effect of that policy on the readiness of infantry battalions. This study is 
designed to isolate one component of readiness, the personnel staffing levels within 
infantry battalions, and assess its impact on the readiness of the force. If the most 
valuable resource for the Marine Corps is its human resources, or Marines, then the 
management of this resource balanced against the time constraints to prepare for 
deployments is a critical relationship the Marine Corps must accurately understand to 
assess the readiness of infantry battalions. 
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1. Background 
In order to understand the nature of this research, it is useful to begin by 
examining related specific policies along with the key actors, relationships, and processes 
involved in this complex problem. Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
(M&RA) is responsible for planning and executing manpower policy for the Marine 
Corps. This task is possibly one of the most complex tasks performed by any 
organization in the Marine Corps, and is impossible to describe in detail due to the 
limitations of this research project. However, having acknowledged the complexity, it is 
important to have an appreciation for the magnitude of the task, which includes managing 
the assignments of the current force inventory that is around 184,100 active duty military 
personnel (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2015). These personnel represent the 
human capital for the organization, and are arguably the most important resource 
possessed by the Marine Corps.   
Today, the operational environment demands expeditionary infantry combat 
formations consisting of well-trained, adaptive, and resilient personnel who are able to 
respond decisively to threats under dynamic conditions. The Marine Corps has 
experienced significant stress on its force, along with its sister services, since Task Force 
58 (TF58) was ordered into Afghanistan in November 2001 (Lowrey, 2011). Following 
the results of the latest Force Structure Review Group (FSRG), the Marine Corps as a 
“middleweight force” is forced to balance sustained high deployment requirements 
focused on crisis response with a reduced mandated end strength and three fewer infantry 
battalions in structure (Smith, 2011). These conditions place a premium on the personnel 
management policies within the service, which are critical to sustain the readiness of its 
small units and set the conditions for them to succeed when deployed.  
Current personnel manning policies have adapted to these conditions as the “new 
normal” since 2001. This research aims to examine the effectiveness of these policies in 
stabilizing infantry battalions with personnel prior to deployment. If they are not 
stabilized, then these policies could create conditions where battalions are unable to 
achieve the necessary repetitions they need to reach proficiency in their mission essential 
tasks (METs), train to standard on unit collective tasks, develop sufficient unit cohesion 
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within their teams, or progress efficiently through collective skills training due to 
personnel turbulence and instability. These factors could reduce the readiness of the unit 
and contribute to other inefficient activities such as needing to conduct resets during pre-
deployment training as new personnel join. This in turn introduces less trained personnel 
and requires internal transfers due to their late arrival to the battalion.   
In addition to increasingly disjointed training while building units, it is possible 
that personnel turbulence leads to inconsistent performance during battalion assessments 
for exercises and for evaluations at the final service level exercise (SLE) to certify 
readiness prior to deployment. In 2012, Major General Thomas Murray, Commanding 
General, TECOM, announced changes to the training objectives for the SLE known as 
Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). The new direction for the exercise is certainly needed to 
adjust to operational requirements, but there also seems to be a new approach for the 
assessment of the exercise forces. This shift in philosophy, from evaluation to coaching, 
could set a dangerous precedent that accepts lower proficiency and leads to eroding the 
nation’s “force in readiness.” It is one thing to do more with less in extremis and teach 
Marines to be adaptive out of necessity; it is entirely different to modify performance 
expectations and change policies because commanders are not producing proficient 
battalions or because the manpower model is not adequately servicing units in a timely 
manner to allow commanders to achieve the desired end state. 
When assessing the impact of personnel stability on readiness, it seems intuitive 
that unit personnel stability, or unit cohesion, should correlate positively with readiness. 
However, it is not clear to what degree this is true, nor is it clear what the most significant 
determinants of unit readiness are for an infantry battalion. This research is focused on 
examining the characteristics of readiness and providing quantitative analysis of the 
relationship between personnel variables and readiness. In doing so, the research can 
provide Marine Corps decision makers with a better understanding of the impact of 
personnel stability relative to the current manpower management policy known as the 
Deployed Unit Staffing Cohesion policy. 
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a. Marine Corps Force Generation Policy 
Since 2001, the Marine Corps has relied on the force generation process to keep 
pace with the demand for forces needed to support numerous operational requirements, 
including crisis response responsibilities, to the nation’s combatant commanders 
(CCDRs). The Marine Corps is expected to maintain the highest readiness levels within 
its force to service the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) with forces, 
or capabilities, ranging from Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and rotational force 
deployments under the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) to contingency and crisis 
response forces called Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs). 
Individual augments may also be sourced from the Marine Corps to fill joint and service 
requirements to operational commanders (Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and 
Operations [DC PP&O], 2013). As the stress on the force has steadily increased over the 
past 15 years, and the time constraints to organize, train, and equip those forces remain in 
effect, a careful review of the effectiveness of Marine Corps personnel management 
policies is warranted. 
The Marine Corps Force Generation (FGEN) policy outlines the process, or 
methodology, the Marine Corps uses to respond to requests for forces (RFF) by 
Combatant Commands through the GFMAP. The purpose of the FGEN process, stated in 
MCO 3502.6A, is “to establish a process that focuses and synchronizes the efforts of 
HQMC, the supporting establishment, and the operating force towards efficiently and 
effectively preparing Marine Corps personnel and units in a timely manner for 
deployment” (DC PP&O, 2013, p. 2). The impact of this policy on unit readiness for the 
Marine Corps, as a force provider for the joint force, is to remain vigilant in assessing 
readiness to maintain the ability to supply forces trained in their mission METs who are 
ready to deploy when requested by Combatant Commands (DC PP&O, 2013).  
The FGEN order outlines the steps the Marine Corps will use to provide a 
“systematic, Service wide approach to selecting, resourcing, and preparing units for 
deployment” (DC PP&O, 2013, p. 3). The approach described in the order provides a 
planning structure and timelines designed to balance the available inventory of forces 
provided by the Marine Corps, so that adequate levels of forces are available when 
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unexpected requirements arise beyond the normal tasking in the GFMAP (see Table 1). 
The FGEN process relies heavily upon careful coordination of requirements through the 
force synchronization conference and the anticipation of future requirements from 
Combatant Commands. The target dates and milestones for Marine units programmed for 
deployment are adjusted following the force synchronization conferences to account for 
changes in deployment schedules identified during the conferences. 
Table 1.   Phases of the Marine Corps Force Generation Process 
Phases Time Event Requirements 




-Assess service capabilities and capacities 
-CCDR operational requirements 
-Develop force sourcing solutions 




-Identified units begin PTP planning 
-Identify staffing, training, resourcing 
requirements 
-Identify shortfall solutions 




-Core MET training combined with assigned 
MET training 
-Units begin readiness reporting 
-Units conduct a mission rehearsal exercise 
-Deployment readiness certified by MEF 
Commander 
-After action assessments to improve follow on 
units 
Phase IV D+0 to R-0 Deploy the 
Force 
-Deploy prepared units to meet CCDR 
requirements 
-After action assessments to improve follow on 
units 




-Redeploy the force to point of origin 
-After action assessments to improve refine the 
process 
Adapted from Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). 
(2013). Marine Corps force generation process (MCO 3502.6A). Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from http://www.marines.mil/Portals 
/59/Publications/MCO%203502.6A.pdf 
The scope of this research focuses on infantry battalions participating in Phase III 
as they “ready the force” for deployment. This period of time is referred to as the pre-
deployment training period (PTP) throughout the remainder of this report. Marine 
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infantry battalions make every effort to ensure they are maximizing their readiness 
metrics whether they are in a deployment cycle or not. In this way, they are prepared to 
support contingency operations or requests for forces that may arise from CCDRs. Every 
deploying Marine infantry battalion is expected to be “staffed, trained, and equipped to 
C-1 readiness and certified in deployment readiness against an assigned METL by the 
MEF Commander” (DC PP&O, 2013, p. 5). Once those criteria are met, then the infantry 
battalion is authorized to deploy per the FGEN order.  
b. Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing Policy 
The Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy, or MARADMIN 585/11, was 
released in October 2011 to provide amplifying guidance for manpower management to 
improve unit cohesion (Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs [DC 
M&RA], 2011). The intent of the message was to “recommend changes to personnel 
assignment policies and plans with the overall goal of increasing unit cohesion at the 
battalion/squadron level” (DC M&RA, 2011, p. 1). The message highlights two specific 
areas that required attention from manpower planners to improve the readiness of Marine 
units participating in the deployment rotations. Pre-deployment stabilization for these 
units, or locking-on for deployment, was directed to occur no less than “six months prior 
to deployment,” with specific ranks and key leaders highlighted for attention (DC 
M&RA, 2011, p.1). The second area mentioned in this message concerns post-
deployment staffing policies. The policy states, “Marines will remain in returning full 
deploying units for 90 days following the completion of the unit deployment with 
minimal exceptions” (DC M&RA, 2011, p. 1). The specific requirements stated in this 
policy are echoed in MCO 3502.6A, and they serve as specified tasks to commanders and 
manpower management personnel in the Marine Corps.   
This policy initially confounded the manpower planning and management system 
and was even referred to as a “wicked problem” by the staff at M&RA (McCarroll, 
2012). Manpower problems whose solutions involve “interactive complexity” (Van 
Riper, 2013) of coordination tend to classify into the “wicked problem” category. 
Nonetheless, it is surprising that the directive was viewed as a problem to begin with, and 
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not the institutional norm for manpower planners, since the Deployed Unit Cohesion 
Staffing policy effectively restated the implied requirements and references already 
outlined in the previous force generation order. There are a number of reasons why the 
specified requirements in the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy are so important to 
deploying units. The policy specifically states parameters to stabilize leadership within 
infantry units throughout their PTP and upon their return for a period of 90 days. This 
stabilization is believed to improve training and preparation for deployment, support the 
effort to build unit cohesion, and provide a mechanism to help units detect and assist 
those Marines who may experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by reducing 
personnel turbulence within deployable units. This research uses manpower data for 
deploying infantry battalions to look for indicators of the effectiveness of this policy 
between the years of 2009 and 2012. 
2. Research Approach 
This research project is concerned with determining the impact of implementing 
the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy on infantry battalion readiness from 2009 to 
2012. In particular, by using multivariate regression analysis, the study empirically 
estimates the relationship between personnel manning and staffing on infantry battalion 
readiness for deployment. Personnel stability is determined by comparing unit personnel 
table of organization (T/O) requirements, authorized strength report (ASR) levels, and 
personnel “on board” by month during the PTP period. More specifically, this research 
addresses the following questions: 
a. Primary Research Question 
 What are the determinants of infantry battalion readiness for deployment? 
b. Secondary Research Questions 
 What is the impact of personnel stability on metrics of infantry battalion 
readiness? 
 Are there specific ranks or occupational specialties that are relatively more 
essential to stabilize earlier in the unit’s PTP to achieve a higher state of 
readiness prior to deployment? 
 8 
3. Benefits of the Study 
This study aims to determine whether personnel stability is a relevant factor in 
forecasting infantry battalion readiness. The results provide insight into the effectiveness 
of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy by analyzing the effect on units prior to 
implementation and the subsequent effect on units after implementation in 2011. An 
additional benefit from this study is the capability to identify specific personnel that 
contribute the most to an infantry battalion’s readiness and analyze the effectiveness of 
the Marine Corps Human Resources Development Process (HRDP) in providing those 
personnel early in a unit’s PTP schedule. The results of this study will help the Marine 
Corps understand the optimal amount of personnel stability required for an infantry 
battalion to prepare for deployment. 
B. RESEARCH METHODS 
This research conducts a quantitative analysis of the research question. The 
presumption, or hypothesis, is that a unit stabilized earlier in the PTP schedule generates 
an infantry battalion with higher readiness ratings. Units with higher readiness ratings are 
more prepared to deploy and able to conduct assigned missions. Ideally, the readiness 
rating indicates the potential of a unit to accomplish their mission. The readiness 
framework used to compare units in this research is based on the description of readiness 
known as the C-rating (P+T+R+S) described in the Marine Corps Readiness Reporting 
Standard Operating Procedures (see Figure 1; DC PP&O, 2010). 
Figure 1.  Multiple Linear Regression Model of Readiness Function 
0 1 2 3 4i i i i i
C P T R S          
 
Adapted from Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). 
(2010). Marine Corps readiness reporting standard operating procedures (SOP) (MCO 
3000.13). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf 
An infantry battalion’s readiness for deployment is described by a representative 
variable comprised of that unit’s overall score during the service level exercise prior to 
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deployment. The research will compare the changes in on-board staffing levels with 
required structure, authorized structure, and staffing goals for infantry battalions during 
Phase III of their PTP to describe the P-rating. The battalion’s T-rating is comprised of a 
factor variable of the battalion’s home station training base, which represents the various 
training opportunities and restrictions to training at those facilities. The significant 
omitted variables for this analysis include factors relating to equipment and supplies that 
contribute to the S and R ratings of the readiness score. These omitted variables are 
acceptable due to the fact that the representation for readiness is not dependent on these 
variables because those activities were not included in the scoring of the unit’s 
performance for the exercise. The methodology proposed for this study allows the 
analysis to isolate the P-rating and to focus on the effect of personnel manning within 
each infantry battalion on their readiness for deployment. 
C. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The following description offers a brief overview of the content within each of the 
remaining chapters in the report: 
 “Literature Review”: This chapter provides a review of the relevant 
existing literature relating to the research question. It begins with 
describing the concept of readiness for the Marine Corps and contains 
information on the manpower process, pre-deployment training process 
for infantry battalions, and an overview of the body of work on the subject 
of cohesion in groups. 
 “Data and Methodology”: This chapter provides a detailed description of 
the methods used to collect, normalize, merge and clean, model, and test 
the data that is used for this study. 
 “Result”: This chapter provides a list of the significant findings that were 
produced as a result of the model used in this study. 
 “Conclusions”: This chapter provides a summary of the research 
conducted for this study, it discusses the results that are relevant to the 
research question, and offers recommendations to improve infantry 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“During times of peace, the most important task of any military is to 
prepare for war.” 
—MCDP-1, Warfighting 
 (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997, p. 53) 
 
A. DESCRIPTION OF MARINE CORPS READINESS 
The phrase “force in readiness” is often used to describe the Marine Corps in 
various forms, from the service’s capstone doctrinal publication known as MCDP-1 
(Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997) to the words written by the 36th Marine Corps 
commandant in his initial planning guidance (CMC, 2015). There is a sense of urgency 
found in the mandate to “be ready” and the effects of the phrase can be observed 
everywhere in the Marine Corps. Every commander bears the responsibility to ensure 
their unit is prepared to conduct assigned missions, potentially on limited notice, in any 
operational environment, and accomplish the mission. 
Similar to many other Department of Defense concepts, the definition of readiness 
set forth in CJCS Guide 3401D is applied differently at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels, which corresponds with the levels of war in joint doctrine.   
Readiness from the tactical perspective focuses on unit readiness, defined 
as the ability to provide capabilities required by the Combatant 
Commander to execute assigned missions, and derived from the ability of 
each unit to conduct the mission(s) for which it was designed. (Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 1–2) 
JP 1–02 defines readiness as “the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of 
assigned missions” (Joint Staff, 2015, p. 200). The purpose of reviewing the definitions is 
to answer the “so what” question of readiness. The Marine Corps must produce units ready 
to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the requests for forces by CCDRs. 
This fact is codified in Public Law 416 set forth by the 82nd Congress and reinforced in 
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United States Code, Title 10, which outlines the roles and missions of the Marine Corps as 
the nation’s force in readiness (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2011). 
The applicable Marine Corps order for readiness echoes the joint definitions and 
goes on to describe two distinct levels of readiness for the service, one it labels as “unit 
readiness” and the other “joint readiness” (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 1–1). Each of these 
readiness categories relate to a specific level of command and have different specified 
requirements. The description of unit readiness outlined in the order highlights the 
requirement of units, such as infantry battalions, to not only be able not only to “execute 
their assigned missions” but it also specifies those units must be able to “deliver the 
outputs for which they were designed” (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 1–1). 
It is not sufficient for a unit to demonstrate the ability to execute the mission, 
there is also an expectation that the unit can perform well and function as it was designed 
for the operation. For the Marine Corps, that means the ability to deliver “balanced, 
combined arms forces with organic command, ground, aviation, and sustainment 
elements” (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1998, p. 69). By achieving this, an infantry 
battalion creates synergy between the parts and functions as a fully integrated Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1998). 
In addition to the levels of readiness described in MCO 3000.13, there are 
readiness codes known as C-level codes that describe a unit’s state of readiness up the 
chain of command to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The five C-level 
codes (see Table 2) present a picture to the CJCS that describes the current status of 
resources (personnel, training, and equipment) contained in that unit and are not meant to 
estimate the potential of that unit once assigned to a Combatant Command for 
employment (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 7–1). Many within the profession see the readiness (C-
level code) of a unit similar to McCarroll (2012) and they equate readiness with the 
deployability of a unit. This seems a fair characterization, since most of the occasions to 
employ the military are “away games,” in the sense that they require the deployment of 
the forces requested away from their home station facility. 
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The principal weakness in the current process for determining readiness is 
captured by a comment in MCO 3000.13: “Readiness codes do not offer insight into the 
unit’s potential once deployed” (DC PP&O, 2010). Under this presumption, the Marine 
Corps, and the entire joint force, is making the claim that all infantry battalions can 
function as designed based on the staffing level of the unit, completion of internally 
assessed training, and possessing the required equipment and supplies. This assumption 
may hold true against guerrilla forces with inferior technology, but the outcome may 
prove different against near peer competition in the future. 
The goal for commanders is to maximize readiness within their unit at all times. 
This approach is supported by the Department of Defense and arguably is intended to 
avoid the creation of a “hollow force” (George, 1999) that is unable to respond to crisis 
or contingency operations with ready forces. Of course, this high degree of readiness 
comes at an incredible financial cost to the government. Many would argue that any cost 
is acceptable to maintain a ready military force, while others, such as Senator John 
McCain, have suggested another approach to military readiness that is called “tiered 
readiness” (George, 1999; McCarroll, 2012). 
In fiscally constrained times, which really describes any period of time, the 
Department of Defense must possess units ready to respond and support the NMS while 
demonstrating fiscal responsibility to achieve readiness. It is possible that other 
approaches, such as tiered readiness, may actually provide better-trained and equipped 
forces to respond to smaller scale contingencies. However, this approach may also come 
at the expense of acting as a sufficient deterrent for nation-states committing larger 
actions. For example, recent aggressive behavior by China and Russian may be attributed 
to the removal of ready armored forces from Europe (Feng, 2015). If the United States 
military is unable to project power against these larger nation-states, it may encourage 
those actors to attempt even larger military operations in the future, rather than the 
smaller, more regional, military activities we have experienced in the last 14 years. 
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Table 2.   C-Level Definitions 
C-Level Definition 
C-1 The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full 
wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource and 
training area status will neither limit flexibility in methods for mission 
accomplishment nor increase vulnerability of unit personnel and equipment. The 
unit does not require any compensation for deficiencies. 
C-2 The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake most of the 
wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource and 
training area status may cause isolated decreases in flexibility in methods for 
mission accomplishment, but will not increase vulnerability of the unit under 
most envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require little, if any, 
compensation for deficiencies. 
C-3 The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, but 
not all, portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or 
designed. The resource or training area status will result in significant decreases 
in flexibility for mission accomplishment and will increase vulnerability of the 
unit under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would 
require significant compensation for deficiencies. 
C-4 The unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime 
mission(s), but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime 
mission(s) with resources on hand. 
C-5 The unit is undertaking a CMC-directed resource action and is not prepared, at 
this time, to undertake the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or 
designed. 
Adapted from Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). 
(2010). Marine Corps readiness reporting standard operating procedures (SOP) (MCO 
3000.13). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf 
The remaining information describes the components of readiness that serve as 
inputs to determine the C-level code for military units. Each category is directed to report 
on specific information within the unit and each category is measured to determine the 
unit’s readiness in that particular functional area. The final C-level code submitted by the 
commander describing the unit’s readiness for the reporting period cannot be higher than 
the lowest rating determined in the personnel, training, or equipment (P, T, S, or R) 
categories (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 7–1). 
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1. Personnel (P-Rating) 
The S-1 section is the proponent for assembling personnel readiness 
measurements in an infantry battalion. Personnel readiness is described by the unit’s P-
rating within the readiness function (see Table 3; DC PP&O, 2010, p. 2–2). The 
personnel readiness rating considers the availability of personnel within the unit in 
relation to non-deployable and structure, but it is also expected to consider the 
qualifications of those personnel to perform their duties (see Figure 2; DC PP&O, 2010, 
p. 2–1). This requires an integrated team that takes input from supervisors within the 
battalion to account for this factor properly. The order allows the infantry battalion to 
designate critical military occupational specialties (MOSs) related to their mission and 
highlight their status within the unit (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 2–3). 
Table 3.     P Rating Calculation 
Rule P1 P2 P3 P4 
Personnel 
Strength 
≥90% 80–89% 70–79% <70% 
MOS Fill ≥85% 75–84% 65–74% <65% 
Source: Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). (2010). 
Marine Corps readiness reporting standard operating procedures (SOP) (MCO 
3000.13). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf 
Figure 2.  Personnel Percentages 
Source: Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). (2010). 
Marine Corps readiness reporting standard operating procedures (SOP) (MCO 
3000.13). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf 
Personnel Strength Percentage 
= (Assigned Strength – Nondeployables / Structure Strength) X 100 
 
MOS Fill Percentage 
= (MOS Fill – Nondeployables / Structure Strength) X 100 
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2. Training (T-Rating) 
One weakness in determining the T-rating is the potential for highly subjective 
input to training. Normally, the proponent of the training rating is the S-3 within an 
infantry battalion. The operations officer collects information from the company 
commanders on the status of training relative to the METs, and presents the assessment to 
the battalion commander for final determination. MCO 3000.13 states, “The T-rating is 
an assessment of the unit’s training to accomplish its designed mission” (DC PP&O, 
2010, p. 5–1). However, it is the infantry battalion’s responsibility, in accordance with 
the guidance of their regimental and division headquarters, to develop an assessment 
methodology to measure the training readiness within the organization. 
The Marine Corps Infantry Training and Readiness (T&R) manual is one 
document that assists commanders in measuring their unit’s training relative to their 
METs (Commanding General, Training and Education Command, 2013). But, this 
document has weaknesses as well, particularly in the area of team and unit level 
collective tasks, which can be more subjective assessments than the more mechanical and 
well-defined individual tasks. 
Another factor that influences infantry battalion training readiness is the effect of 
internal and external personnel transfers that occur in the unit. These events tend to make 
it difficult for the battalion to reflect its proper state of training readiness accurately. The 
arrival of new personnel during the PTP schedule or the re-assignment of existing 
personnel should lower the T-rating in that period, if the units are considering those 
factors, until those personnel have caught up to the rest of the unit. 
As the battalion progresses, it is likely to schedule its training events to build from 
the team, then to squad, then to platoon, and company levels to gain proficiency in each 
MET in a manner that builds upon the previous events. Each training event is progressive 
and adds complexity by increasing the size of the unit training to the given standard in the 
T&R manual. For instance, once the unit moves from 5000 to 6000 level tasks it is 
assumed that all members of the unit are proficient and evaluated on all previous tasks. 
When new Marines arrive it forces a regression in training to reset the unit to that 
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proficiency level. The arrival of new personnel during these steps can have a disruptive 
and negative effect on the unit’s training plan. 
The order offers commanders the flexibility to consider these factors and adjust 
the C-level code reported through DRRS-MC, but they must provide comments to 
explain the decision and not alter the T-rating reported. Therefore, the final determination 
of training readiness relies on the commander’s judgment to assess the training readiness 
of the whole unit while acting within the guidance provided in the order (see Table 4). 
Table 4.   T-Rating Calculation 
Rule T1 T2 T3 T4 
Percentage of Core METs 
Trained to Standard 
≥85% 70–84% 55–69% <55% 
Source: Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). (2010). 
Marine Corps readiness reporting standard operating procedures (SOP) (MCO 
3000.13). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf 
3. Equipment (S-Rating/R-Rating) 
The final category measured for an infantry battalion that contributes toward its 
readiness for deployment is equipment readiness. The status of equipment is typically 
supervised by the battalion executive officer and primarily supported by the S-4 and the 
S-6 in an infantry battalion. This category specifically deals with the “quantity and 
quality of equipment” items the battalion has relative to its assigned table of equipment 
(T/E; DC PP&O, 2010, p. 3–1).   
To account for both of these measurements, equipment readiness is divided into 
two separate ratings: S-rating and R-rating (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 3–1). As stated in MCO 
3000.13, “the S-rating is a material measurement of an organization’s possessed 
equipment quantity against its designed requirement. The R-rating indicates the material 
condition of the organization’s possessed equipment” (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 3–1). 
The structure requirements, or tables of equipment, for all Marine units are 
managed by Total Force Structure Division (TFSD) within Marine Corps Combat 
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Development Command (MCCDC) and maintained in the Total Force Structure 
Management System (TFSMS; DC PP&O, 2010, p. 3–2). Specific unit equipment found 
on the T/E is designated as either mission essential equipment (MEI) or principal end 
item (PEI), and each type of equipment has separate guidelines to consider for calculating 
the associated ratings (see Tables 5 and 6; DC PP&O, 2010, p. 3–3). 
Table 5.   S-Rating Calculation 
Rule S1 S2 S3 S4 
Mission Essential Equipment (MEI) ≥90% 80-89% 65-79% <65% 
Support Equipment (PEI) ≥90% 80-89% 65-79% <65% 
Adapted from Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). 
(2010). Marine Corps readiness reporting standard operating procedures (SOP) (MCO 
3000.13). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf 
Table 6.   R-Rating Calculation 
Rule R1 R2 R3 R4 
Mission Essential Equipment (MEI) ≥90% 70-89% 60-69% <60% 
Support Equipment (PEI) ≥90% 70-89% 60-69% <60% 
Adapted from Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). 
(2010). Marine Corps readiness reporting standard operating procedures (SOP) (MCO 
3000.13). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%203000.13.pdf 
4. Mission Essential Task (MET) Assessment 
The mission essential task (MET) assessment reports the unit’s ability to perform 
each of its mission essential tasks. These tasks are divided into three categories that relate 
to the types of missions they may be called upon to support. Core METs are common to 
all units that perform the same function, such as infantry battalions. The next category is 
Major OPLAN/CONPLAN METs, which a unit may be assigned once it is sourced to 
support a specific operational plan for a CCDR. The final category, Named Operation 
METs, relates to specific operations that are designated by the CJCS (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 
4–2). Each MET that an infantry battalion is assigned, whether only Core METs or a 
combination of the categories, requires a report on the status of those METs and the 
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battalion’s ability to accomplish them. The status of the METs is described by submitting 
one of three assessments: yes, qualified yes, or no (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 4–2). 
5. Commander’s Assessments 
Commanders are responsible for reviewing and approving all of the content 
contained in the readiness report, but they are specifically tasked to provide their personal 
assessments by assigning the C-level to the unit along with their percent effective 
(PCTEF) assessment, as required. The order states: “The C-level reflects the status of the 
selected unit resources measured against the resources required to undertake the core 
mission for which the unit is task organized or designed” (DC PP&O, 2010, p. 7–1). 
These represent the unit’s status in its Core METs, which are the fundamental tasks every 
infantry battalion is expected to be able to perform. The PCTEF assessment differs from 
the C-level in that it relates specifically to the assigned mission METs and they may be 
significantly different from the Core METs of the unit (DC PP&O, 2010).   
The combination of C-level and the PCTEF assessments, along with the other 
details provided by the unit for personnel, training, and equipment, comprise the 
readiness report that is reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to assess military 
capabilities and the availability of units for employment. However, Horowitz (1986) 
pointed out that one must understand the interaction between these elements to know the 
final effect on readiness (Horowitz, 1986, pp. 4–6). The interaction of these parts seems 
to be accounted for by affording Commanders the flexibility to adjust the final C-level for 
the battalion. Another significant claim made by Horowitz (1986) is that the personnel 
category should not be part of the readiness function (see Figure 1) at all because the 
“quality and quantity of people attached to a unit” have a “multifaceted and indirect role” 
with the other categories (Horowitz, 1986, pp. 4–6). According to the readiness models 
presented by Horowitz (1986), personnel is so critical to understanding the readiness of a 
unit that it should be measured separately with special attention paid to its effect on the 
other readiness factors. This adds credibility to need to understand the impact of 
personnel stability on unit readiness. 
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B. THE HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The Marine Corps Human Resources Development Process (HRDP) is the 
enterprise-level manpower architecture, or system of systems, managed by the deputy 
commandant of manpower and reserve affairs (DC M&RA). The collective activities 
involved in the HRDP create and execute policy to ensure manpower requirements from 
commanders in the operational forces and the supporting establishment are fulfilled. This 
task places a premium on planning and coordination to provide personnel at the right 
place at the right time for all Marine units (Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration [DC CD&I], 2009). 
In support of this goal, the HRDP relies on close coordination with the office of 
Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), an equivalent command, to integrate the 
assignment of personnel with the Total Force Structure Process (TFSP) for the Marine 
Corps. For the HRDP to work properly, three major processes within the Marine Corps 
must function in harmony: the force structure process (CD&I), the manpower staffing 
process (M&RA), and the training development process (CD&I). The interaction of these 
processes contributes to provide the optimal solution for the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (DC CD&I, 2009). 
It is impossible to explain the details of this complex process fully in the limited 
scope of this report. This report provides a general overview of the HRDP with emphasis 
on the process flow and the assignments process. Barry and Gillikin (2005) described the 
HRDP as having four distinct quadrants, each with inputs and outputs, that assess the 
manpower challenges under the given constraints and organize the information in a 
manner that leads to personnel assignments. The four quadrants of the HRDP are 
described as requirements, programming, planning, and execution (see Figure 3; Barry & 
Gillikin, 2005). The commandant is actively involved in this process, providing planning 
guidance and setting the priorities necessary to reach the desired level of readiness for the 
Marine Corps. The readiness of operational forces and supporting establishment units in 
the Marine Corps is directly impacted by the efficiency and effectiveness of these 
headquarters organizations to execute the commandant’s guidance for the force. 
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Figure 3.  Marine Corps Human Resource Development Process (HRDP) 
 
Source: Barry, J. C., & Gillikin, P. L. (2005). Comparative analysis of Navy and Marine 
Corps planning, programming, budgeting and execution systems from a manpower 
perspective. (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2322 
1. Manpower Requirements 
There are two distinct processes that must be carefully integrated to allocate 
required and budgeted “spaces” to the right “faces” in the Marine Corps. The 
organizations involved in this activity must define structure (CD&I) and deliver 
appropriate personnel (M&RA) and equipment (CD&I) to Marine Corps units. 
Manpower requirements are derived from the force structure outlined in tables of 
organization (T/O) that are necessary for units to accomplish their assigned missions. 
This force structure, based on assigned missions, defines Marine Corps requirements to 
Congress for appropriations and serves as the point of departure for the HRDP. 
The requirement validation process begins with the civilian leadership and the 
guidance from the NMS and includes several key military actors and stakeholders such as 
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the commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), and 
advocates (Deputy Commandants). The assistant commandant of the Marine Corps 
(ACMC) chairs the Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) that is responsible 
for bringing the advocates together to ensure the requirements are valid and to reconcile 
existing requirements against the current needs identified by operational commanders. 
There are three mechanisms available to commanders to identify personnel or 
resource shortfalls: the table of organization and equipment change request (TOECR), the 
universal needs statement (UNS), and the urgent universal needs statement (UUNS; DC 
CD&I, 2009). After routing through the chain of command, these requests are “staffed” 
and “a recommended solution is provided to DC CD&I” by Total Force Structure 
Division (TFSD) (DC CD&I, 2009, p. 5–2). Any shortfall in warfighting capability that is 
identified to the MROC is first resolved within existing Doctrine, Operations, Training, 
Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) before seeking external 
solutions or additional funding. 
The CMC sets the priority for the manning and staffing of Marine Corps units 
relative to the stated manpower requirements (T/O) through the guidance provided in 
MCO 5320.12H (Commandant of the Marine Corps [CMC], 2012). The manning and 
staffing precedence order directs the DC CD&I to supervise the force structure process, 
including the development of the Authorized Strength Report (ASR), which balances the 
authorized end strength against force structure requirements and manning controls (CMC, 
2012). The order also designates the DC M&RA as the lead for the HRDP that takes the 
ASR published by the DC CD&I and staffs Marine units according to the CMCs 
priorities and available personnel inventory (CMC, 2012). There are four precedence 
level categories used to allocate personnel to monitored command codes (MCC) outlined 
in the order (CMC, 2012). Each precedence level specifies the CMC’s minimum 
requirements for each type of command (see Table 7).  
  
 23 





















Commands that while not excepted or specifically 








Those units not categorized within the Excepted, 
OpFor, or Priority manning precedence levels 
Adapted from Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). (2012). Precedence levels for 
manning and staffing (MCO 5320.12H). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. 
Retrieved from http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%205320.12H.pdf 
2. Manning Process 
The manning process is conducted by Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC) under the supervision of the DC CD&I. Force structure (T/O) 
requirements are the Marine Corps stated personnel requirement to accomplish their 
assigned missions. These requirements are not specifically constrained by law, but in 
practice, the service attempts to ensure the size remains relatively the same from year to 
year. An interesting point for operational commanders, relating to their T/O’s, is that 
Congress may not actually appropriate funds to pay for the entire force structure in the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Depending on the severity of the budget 
shortfall, there may be difficult decisions for the DC CD&I and DC M&RA to optimize 
the use of manpower in the force. The effect of these decisions may indirectly lead to 
unplanned and unwanted force shaping similar to what George (1999) described as tiered 
readiness. Under these conditions, Commanders may be forced to shift personnel around 
to make the next deploying unit ready, rather than the normal progression that allows the 
service to sustain maximum readiness within most of its units. 
In addition to funding, Congress and the Marine Corps impose constraints and 
manning controls that impact the number of Marines available to fill billets (Strobl, 
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2005). Congressionally mandated constraints include the targeted aggregate end strength 
of the service and restrictions within grades for officer and senior enlisted personnel, and 
neither of these constraints are tied to mission requirements (Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs, 2015). Finally, the Marine Corps handles personnel who are patients, prisoners, 
trainees, and transients (P2T2) by subtracting P2T2 from its end strength prior to 
calculating authorized strength. What this effectively means is that P2T2 are funded but 
not assignable to operating forces. That equates to an overhead cost close to 17% of the 
total allowable end strength that is not available for assignment to a billet every year 
(Strobl, 2005). The benefit of this manning control is to ensure that the Marine Corps 
continues to invest in training and educating its force, by paying the bill up front, 
although that investment comes at the expense of shortages in the inventory to fill some 
units in the Marine Corps (Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 2015). 
The goal, or output, for the force structure process is to produce a plan to allocate 
manning to T/O requirements (Strobl, 2005). This is accomplished when the DC CD&I 
publishes the authorized strength report (ASR). The ASR is calculated, generally 
speaking, by comparing the T/O, mandated end strength, manning controls, and 
subtracting P2T2 (Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 2015). The solution to this model 
allocates manning for the Marine Corps and produces what is known as the authorized 
strength of the Marine Corps (see Figure 3). Once the ASR is published, the process 
shifts from CD&I (manning) to M&RA (staffing) with the objective of assigning 
available personnel to units. 
3. Staffing Process 
The staffing process is directed by the DC M&RA and begins upon receipt of the 
ASR from the DC CD&I. M&RA is a large organization with numerous divisions, but 
this report focuses on the following two major divisions: Manpower Plans division (MP) 
and Manpower Management division (MM). Manpower Plans is responsible for 
developing the personnel inventory to “grow and shape” the force (Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs, 2015). Manpower Management distributes the personnel inventory 
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according to the results of the staffing goal model (SGM) and then assigns personnel to 
specific units (Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 2015).  
Manpower Plans (MP) is responsible for force shaping and uses a forecasting 
model called the Total Force Projection Model (TFPM) to produce the grade adjusted 
recapitulation (GAR) from the ASR (Barry & Gillikin, 2005). The GAR represents “the 
target (ideal) inventory” for the Marine Corps (Barry & Gillikin, 2005). Generally 
speaking, the GAR is developed by taking the ASR and adding P2T2 back into the 
model. Next, the model accounts for B-billets that are not associated with a primary 
military occupational specialty (MOS). Once that is accomplished, the existing 
constraints and manning controls are applied, which produces a holistic picture of the 
future inventory for manpower planners (Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 2015). The 
results of the GAR provide manpower planners with the information necessary to drive 
the accession, classification, promotion, retention, and bonus plans for the Marine Corps. 
The GAR is the primary tool used to evaluate the health and sustainability of the force, 
and it frames the decision space to senior leaders who set manpower policy for the 
service (Barry & Gillikin, 2005). 
4. Distributing and Assigning Personnel 
Manpower Management (MM) is comprised of the MOS monitors and their 
supervisors who are concerned with the “close fight” of distributing and assigning 
personnel. MM uses the ASR as the principal input to determine unit staffing goals, 
which serve as “the mission for the monitors” (Strobl, 2005). It is important to note that 
MCO 5320.12H allows for grade substitution, which is where the 1-up/1-down concept in 
the assignment process comes from (CMC, 2012). This policy is a way that manpower 
managers mitigate the shortages within grades in relation to aggregate end strength that 
exists for some MOSs (Strobl, 2005). 
The manpower management assignments process is basically a two-step process 
that begins with establishing an acceptable distribution of the inventory (unit staffing 
goals) and then assigning specific personnel to units (Barry & Gillikin, 2005). The 
process starts with the ASR and the available inventory available “to optimally match 
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staffing to manned billets in the ASR” (Strobl, 2005). This is accomplished through the 
use of the staffing goal models (SGMs) (Barry & Gillikin, 2005). The results of the 
SGMs are then checked for compliance with the guidance provided by the CMC in the 
precedence and manning order (Barry & Gillikin, 2005). Once the optimal distribution, or 
unit staffing goals, is established the command staffing report (CSR) is published and the 
assignment process begins for the monitors. MOS monitors consider the remaining 
factors such as individual preferences, career progressions, and oversees control dates 
before making a final determination on assignment and issuing orders to direct a Marine 
to a unit (Barry & Gillikin, 2005). 
Figure 4.  Relationship Between Endstrength, Manning Levels, and Staffing 
Levels 
 
Source: Manpower Management Officer Assignments. (2005). Officer assignments 
[PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from https://www.manpower.usmc.mil/portalpage 
/portal/M_RA_HOME 
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The key take-away from this overview of the HRDP is that assignments originate 
from the T/O, but they are constrained by much more than the structure alone. There are 
several inputs and dictionary rules that drive the process. The CSR and staffing goals are 
the key components to the assignment process. There are many factors that influence the 
aggregate number of Marines available to be assigned to a battalion during each year (see 
Figure 4). The cascading effect of these constraints and manning controls on end strength 
tends to result in shortages of personnel in certain MOSs. The Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) conducted a study on officer shortages from 1990 to 2005 and found evidence of 
shortages of PMOS against the GAR and assignment shortages below 85% of structure 
(McHugh et al., 2006). The primary finding in the CNA report relating to officer staffing 
within infantry battalions was a systemic shortage for MAGTF intelligence officers 
(McHugh et al., 2006). Shortages will likely continue to occur in high demand/low 
density MOSs, ceteris paribus, unless the MOS pipelines are redesigned, personnel 
inventory increases, or the structure for these MOSs decreases within the Marine Corps. 
One of the goals of this research is to identify the most significant MOSs relative to 
readiness to offer some insight into where the Marine Corps should begin looking to 
improve the HRDP for infantry battalions. 
C. ENHANCED MOJAVE VIPER 
Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) began in 2009, adapted from the existing Mojave 
Viper program, to focus the Marine Corps pre-deployment certification exercise toward 
the operational culture requirements for forces deploying to Afghanistan. The exercise is 
conducted aboard Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) in Twentynine 
Palms, California, and supervised by the Tactical Training Exercise and Control Group 
(TTECG). TTECG is the service level organization tasked with evaluating Marine Corps 
unit performance, specifically infantry battalions, prior to deployment. The mission 
statement for the organization at this time states: “Conduct block IV pre-deployment 
training program (PTP) assessment of tactical elements of the MAGTF in the execution 
of core competency combined arms techniques and procedures during full spectrum 
operations in order to prepare units for deployment to OEF” (Tactical Training Exercise 
and Control Group [TTECG], 2010). TTECG has a unique perspective as evaluators 
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because they see numerous units each year and they are staffed with the subject matter 
experts (SMEs) to assess each unit’s proficiency in their assigned mission essential tasks 
(METs). 
The assessment TTECG provides during EMV serves as a service level training 
event (SLTE) for the exercise force (EXFOR) outlined in MCO 3500.11F (DC CD&I, 
2015) and meets the requirements for a mission rehearsal stated in MCO 3502.6 (see 
Table 8; DC PP&O, 2010). EMV was normally the final certification exercise for 
infantry battalions that deployed in support of OEF between 2009 and 2012. The 
successful completion of EMV signals that the battalion is ready to deploy, having 
completed the required phase III “ready the force” activities, and the directed PTP 
training outlined in MCO 3502.6 (see Table 8; DC PP&O, 2010). 
Table 8.  Marine Corps Pre-Deployment Training Program Blocks 
Block Category Description Responsibility 
for Assessment 
Remarks 
Block 1 Individual 
Training 
Formal schools, sustained core 
skills training, core plus skills 






Block 2 Collective 
Training 
Core capabilities and theater-
specific training conducted by 




Unit HHQ supports 
assessment. TECOM 
supports training. 
Block 3 Advanced 
Collective 
Training 
Core (plus) capabilities 
training conducted by the 
unit’s higher headquarters, 
and/or by other agencies. 
Battalion-level.  
Unit HHQ Unit HHQ supports 
assessment. TECOM 
supports training. 
Block 4 MRX The graduation pre-
deployment training exercise. 
Individually tailored to support 
and assess a unit’s ability to 















Adapted from Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O). 
(2010). Marine Corps force generation process (MCO 3502.6). Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Marine Corps. 
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1. Infantry Battalion Assessed Objectives 
The training at EMV allows an infantry battalion to leverage and test all of the 
warfighting functions and truly experience the power and capability of the MAGTF. The 
assessment provided by TTECG is centered on the battalion’s Core METs to validate the 
proficiency of the unit in the conduct of mission profiles associated with those tasks 
within the framework and context of an Afghan scenario. The exercise is organized 
around four Marine Corps Tasks (MCTs), which correspond to battalion METs, and each 
training event requires the battalion to perform the individual and collective tasks 
required to achieve proficiency in those METs (see Figure 5). The goal for TTECG is to 
provide realistic training scenarios that test the battalion’s planning and execution while 
providing feedback to those conducting the exercise. The four METs assessed during the 
exercise are offensive operations, defensive operations, military operations other than 
war, and counterinsurgency operations. Along with these four METs, the battalion is also 
assessed on its employment of basic warrior skills that are indicators of the discipline and 
force protection awareness of the unit. At the completion of the exercise, the infantry 
battalion has been tested in all of its critical warfighting functions and the commander 
understands the strengths and weaknesses of the battalion.  
  
 30 
Figure 5.  Infantry Battalion Assessed Objectives 
 
Source: Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG). (2010a). Exercise 
Mojave Viper: Exercise overview [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from 
https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/msc/magtftc/TTECG/Shared%20Documents/Forms/
AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=/sites/msc/magtftc/TTECG/Shared%20Documents 
2. Sequence of Events 
The exercise design incorporates a “crawl, walk, run” approach and each training 
event builds on the previous event in size and complexity (TTECG, 2010). For battalions 
not located at MCAGCC, the training begins well before the first training day. The 
planning and coordination required to move an infantry battalion from home station to 
MCAGCC tests the battalion’s force deployment capability and procedures, which offers 
valuable insight into the agility, discipline, and expeditionary nature of the unit. It can be 
a significant task to plan and execute movement, arrive on time, and reconstitute with the 
appropriate personnel and equipment to conduct the training exercise. Specific guidance 
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relating to the rapid deployment of Marine Corps forces is contained in MCO 3000.18B 
Force Deployment Planning and Execution Manual (FDP&E Manual). 
Once the battalion arrives, they complete reception, staging, onward movement, 
and integration and finalize coordination with the TTECG staff to certify that the 
battalion is ready to participate in the exercise. TTECG organizes the exercise into four 
training blocks that are referred to as “clear, hold, build” or CHB 1 through 4 (TTECG, 
2010). Each of the prescribed training blocks consists of a series of individual and 
collective training events that are assessed in terms of strengths and weaknesses for the 
unit relative to the Infantry T&R standards (see Figure 6). Although the exercise is also a 
training exercise, the TTECG staff does not consider it their mission to train the EXFOR 
participating in the exercise. 
TTECG is concerned with assessing the proficiency of the battalion in their Core 
METs and the application of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to 
complete the training events. This philosophy has recently changed to more “training” 
and “coaching” from TTECG as described in the current standing operating procedures  
(TTECG, 2014) and command brief (TTECG, 2015). The question our senior leaders 
need to investigate is whether this philosophical change occurred because it is the best 
use of Coyote resources (adds value to readiness), or whether the approach changed 
because battalions are not arriving prepared for a rigorous evaluation by TTECG to 
certify them for deployment. 
EMV begins with CHB-1. This series of events occurs from training day (TD) 1 
through 11 in the schedule. The training consists of introductory academics, site 
exploitation and cultural lane training, first responder, sniper training, fire support 
coordination exercises, and infantry platoon and company level combined arms training 
on the 400-series ranges. CHB-2 occurs from TD 12–19 and is built around a series of 
company-sized combined arms operations. Each company will conduct either a 
mechanized attack or a heliborne attack and transition into a defense of the objective. 
TTECG personnel evaluate the task-organized company team’s ability to conduct 
offensive, defensive, and COIN/MOOTW during this block. CHB-3 occurs on TD 20–21 
and tests the battalion’s ability to plan, occupy, and conduct a battalion defensive 
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operation. The battalion is expected to demonstrate proficiency in all of the tasks 
associated with occupying a defense and then in its ability to conduct a simulated fight 
against an adversary from its defensive position. The battalion completes CHB-3 by 
executing a counterattack from its deliberate defensive position. The final training block 
is CHB-4, or the mission rehearsal exercise (MRX), that is conducted from TD 22–28. 
This is a non–live fire scenario that integrates operational culture through the use of 
mission specific role players. CHB-4 presents the EXFOR with a full speed, realistic 
training scenario designed to replicate conditions in the current operating environment. 
Figure 6.  EMV Training Schedule 
 
Source: Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG). (2009). Exercise 




3. Assessment Methodology 
The assessment methodology used by TTECG for exercise forces at EMV is 
designed around three categories: trained (T), partially trained (P), or untrained (U). Each 
training event has a performance checklist that contains the collective tasks from the 
Infantry T&R Manual pertaining to that training event. The TTECG staff, also commonly 
referred to as “Coyotes” during the exercise, assess the performance of the unit 
conducting the training and submit their results to the TTECG Academics section. At the 
conclusion of each exercise, the EXFOR is debriefed on its performance and systemic 
trends are noted to the battalion commander of the EXFOR and the director of TTECG. 
The EXFOR’s final results are forwarded to the battalion’s Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) commander for final review and certification for deployment. The battalion will 
use the final out brief from TTECG to guide its Block V (remediation) training plan with 
any remaining time it has prior to deployment.  
Figure 7.  EMV Assessment Methodology (T/P/U) 
 
Source: Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG). (2010b). FPC brief to 




D. THE ROLE OF COHESION IN THE MARINE CORPS 
This section addresses the topic of cohesion, because the word cohesion appears 
in the policy directive driving the changes to the manpower process. However, the 
research in this study does not address the numerous sociological and psychological 
factors that must be included in any analysis of group cohesion. The purpose of including 
this information is strictly for context and to establish that personnel stability is at least a 
significant part of cohesion. It is not believed that any correlation between personnel 
stability and readiness constitutes a causal relationship with unit cohesion. To establish a 
causal relationship, one must conduct extensive research in areas that are well beyond the 
scope of this report. 
1. Description of Cohesion in Groups 
Military group cohesion has its roots in the study of how individuals relate to their 
primary group (Cooley, 1962). It involves the bond between individuals and the people 
they immediately interact with at the lowest level. From there, the study of cohesion goes 
on to examine the levels of cohesion and includes topics such as social and task cohesion, 
social relationships, relationship to performance, emotional and instrumental factors, goal 
commitment, teamwork, bonding, and trust (Siebold, 2011). Siebold (2011) presented a 
comprehensive review of the literature and the progression of the military’s 
understanding of the topic of cohesion by outlining the work from social-psychologists 
and other experts in the study of group cohesion. The author describes the importance of 
cohesion thus: 
This interaction between the parts and the whole is at the heart of social 
psychology or, more specifically, the relationship between the individual 
members and their group as well as among the members. In this arena, 
cohesion pertains to the extent to which the parts come together to form 
the social group and hold together under stress to maintain the group. 
Cohesion is thus a relevant social matter to most groups and organizations 
in social institutions such as education, business, and government. It is 
particularly relevant to the military where group cohesion can at times 
provide the difference between winning and losing, life and death. (p. 450) 
The significance of the study of group cohesion in the military is critical to understanding 
how to build cohesive units in the Marine Corps properly. The current body of 
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knowledge presented by Siebold (2011) is captured in a model called “The Standard 
Model” which is a framework for understanding cohesion in small groups and is 
structured around “the primary group” and “the secondary group” (Siebold, 2011, p. 
455). Each group represents a different level of bonding and contains unique 
characteristics that affect the degree of cohesion that can be achieved (Siebold, 2011). 
2. Does the Marine Corps Need a Cohesion Policy? 
The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy, explained in MCDP-1, presents an 
extensive argument for the importance of cohesion in military units (Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1997). The maneuver warfare concept is central to the warfighting 
philosophy and serves as the guiding operational concept for the Marine Corps. 
Maneuver warfare was introduced in the 1980s to enable the Marine Corps, a relatively 
small force, to compete against a numerically superior force. Maneuver warfare relies on 
the focused and combined efforts of the military force aimed at the critical weakness of 
the adversary to  
render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, 
mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, 
coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the 
incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more  
costly and time-consuming (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997, p. 
73) 
This unique approach to warfighting is intended to optimize the allocation and 
employment of its limited resources against a numerically superior opponent with an 
emphasis, in part, toward disrupting cohesion. This suggests the Marine Corps believes 
unit cohesion is important, especially since the fundamental warfighting concept is 
directed at taking that advantage away from an adversary. 
Applying this warfighting philosophy to personnel management, MCDP-1 goes 
on to state,  
The personnel management system should seek to achieve personnel 
stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering cohesion, 
teamwork, and implicit understanding. We recognize that casualties in war 
will take a toll on personnel stability, but the greater stability a unit has 
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initially, the better it will absorb those casualties and incorporate 
replacements (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997, pp. 64–65) 
MCDP-1 makes a significant effort to demonstrate the importance of unit cohesion in its 
text, primarily for the benefits it offers its units and the opportunities to exploit against its 
adversaries, so it seems logical to continue researching this claim in more detail. 
In a similar study conducted on U.S. Army units, Peterson (2008) discussed the 
need to “disentangle personnel stability, unit cohesion, and unit effectiveness” (p. 17) to 
understand the impact they have on personnel management policy in the military. Several 
detailed studies including Shils and Janowitz (1948), Millett, Murray, and Watman 
(1986), Butler, Blair, Phillips, and Schmitt (1987), and Beal, Cohen, Burke and 
McLendon (2003) attempted to define these variables and describe their relationship to 
the question of cohesion. It is clear that a detailed discussion on unit cohesion can quickly 
become a complicated conversation based on the understanding and relationship of these 
terms. As presented by Bassford (1990), any discussion of unit cohesion must go beyond 
a simple discussion of personnel stability, which this research is unable to accomplish, 
but mentions in an attempt to place the hypothesis in proper context. As Bassford (1990) 
observes: 
The fundamental problem is probably in our concept of the meaning of 
“cohesion,” and our illusion that it is synonymous with personnel stability. 
Simply keeping 100 (or 16,000) soldiers together for three (or 30) years 
will not bring battlefield cohesion. It is not enough simply that these 
people know each other intimately; this is romanticism. Familiarity is far 
more likely to breed contempt than it is to produce ‘tight, proud families. 
(pp. 75–76) 
In the effort to assess the impact of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy 
on the Marine Corps during the years 2009 to 2012, this research focuses solely on the 
impact of personnel stability and its contribution to unit cohesion. Clearly, there are many 
other factors involved in describing cohesion; however, personnel stability is a significant 
part of that solution. It is more important for the Marine Corps to understand the impact 
of personnel stability on unit readiness. The hypothesis for this study is that personnel 
stability leads to higher readiness in the force. If that is true, then personnel stability is 
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significant for that reason, even if the degree that personnel stability contributes to 
cohesion cannot be determined from this research. 
3. Significance of Personnel Stability—Is It Even Relevant? 
In order to engage in critical thinking, one must thoroughly cross-examine 
perceived truths and question the assumptions behind those beliefs to either validate or 
disprove the stated claim. The Marine Corps places significance on the idea of unit 
cohesion. There is also a large body of work on the topic, and several of the findings 
regarding relevance are quite interesting. In Simmons (2001), the author stated a desire to 
rethink cohesion:  
One aim in doing this is to underline the fact that everyone need not like 
one another or be alike in order to attain a common goal. A corollary aim 
is to point out that the degree of attention traditionally paid to peer 
bonding is overblown (Simmons, 2001, p. 5) 
There appears to be a wide range of academic opinions relating to the significance of 
personnel stability. The Marine Corps clearly believes that cohesion is relevant, but there 
is a gray area for discussion relating to the group levels targeted by current policy and the 
effectiveness of those policies enhancing unit cohesion. 
MCO 3500.28 outlines the Marine Corps Unit Cohesion Program. The purpose of 
this program is “to establish a program that will enhance unit readiness and stability 
throughout the operating forces of the Marine Corps” (CMC, 1999, p. 1). This order 
describes the important aspects of the transformation process, as recruits are transitioned 
from the civilian sector to become members of the military. It explains the importance the 
Marine Corps places on building the cohesion of teams and units in the organization. The 
fundamental concept driving this policy is the idea of moving Marines from basic 
training to their operational commands in groups, and then conducting their subsequent 
deployments together, to maximize the amount of time Marines spend training together 
and building trust with each other. This policy solves part of the problem, if the cohorts 
are actually assigned to units in this manner, but it does not resolve the remaining issue 
relating to the amount of time spent with the leaders in the unit prior to deployment. The 
end result is often a truncated pre-deployment cycle for the Marines with their leadership. 
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The other factor contributing to this problem is Marines arriving into their deploying 
units to find their leader away at school because they require additional training. Creating 
cohesive groups formed during entry-level training (ELT) may not translate to proficient 
teams ready for deployment. 
Cohesion seems to begin with the primary group bonds as Siebold (2011) 
explained in his model. Nevertheless, the discussion of cohesion must extend to the 
secondary group for military organizations. This is supported by Bassford (1990) who 
described military unit cohesion as the “bonding of soldiers of equal rank as well as 
between ranks, commitment of all ranks to the military mission, and the affirmation of 
special properties of their group, team, crew, company, or battery that keeps them alive in 
combat” (Bassford, 1990). Cowdrey (1995) described the concept of primary and 
secondary group cohesion within the framework of “vertical and horizontal integration” 
(pp. 3–4) between leaders, Marines, and the personnel management systems found in the 
Marine Corps. Jozwiak (1999) expanded upon the Cowdrey (1995) explanation of 
vertical and horizontal integration by including a model by Dr. Nora Stewart that adds the 
components of organizational and societal cohesion (Jozwiak, 1999). These frameworks 
outlined by Cowdrey (1995) and Jozwiak (1999) appear to support the underlying factors 
of cohesion described by Siebold (2011). The Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy 
appears to address the factors of “vertical and horizontal” cohesion described by 
Cowdrey (1995) and the “primary and secondary groups” outlined by Siebold (2011). 
What is still unknown is how effective the policy is contributing to the cohesion of these 
groups. 
The German model provides some insight into the importance of team building 
and the factors required to develop “primary group” bonds in military units (Shils & 
Janowitz, 1948, p. 280). Shils and Janowitz (1948) detailed the characteristics leading to 
successful unit cohesion in the German military in World War II and outlined the 
numerous factors that contributed to the effectiveness of German military units. The 
authors described the factors affecting German military cohesion and the ability to fight 
effectively under brutal conditions: 
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Deterioration of group solidarity in the Wehrmacht which began to appear 
toward the very end of the war was most frequently found in hastily 
fabricated units. These were made up of new recruits, dragooned 
stragglers, air force men who had been forced into the infantry (and who 
felt a loss of status in the change), men transferred from the navy into the 
infantry to meet the emergency of manpower shortage, older factory 
workers, concentration camp inmates, and older married men who had 
been kept in reserve throughout the war and who had remained with the 
familial primary group until the last moment. (p. 288) 
This finding lends some credibility to the argument that personnel stability does 
have an impact on combat readiness. The Germans were so successful at preserving the 
critical, intangible characteristic of unit cohesion by ensuring personnel had sufficient 
time to assimilate and train together prior to experiencing contact with an adversary. This 
applied to units directly engaged in combat. Once units were rendered completely combat 
ineffective, due to heavy losses on the battlefield, they would remove the entire unit from 
the front to a rear area and re-generate that unit prior to pushing them forward again into 
combat (Shils & Janowitz, 1948). According to Shils and Janowitz (1948), the rifle 
company was the most important level of an infantry formation to focus the effort of 
preserving unit cohesion. Additionally, the Germans believed the rifle company was the 
highest level infantry formation for which unit cohesion was relevant, because the 
personal interaction and team cohesion was vital to the success of that type of unit (Shils 
& Janowitz, 1948). 
Based on these points, personnel stability appears to matter in the discussion of 
generating cohesion, but the extent to which stability matters on readiness is still open to 
debate. The study conducted by Peterson (2008) made a similar claim based on his 
research regarding personnel stability. He also claimed that the level at which cohesion 
occurs is significant, which was verified in the findings of his study. As Peterson (2008) 
stated: 
Primary group cohesion is a small group phenomenon that quickly loses 
its motivational effect above platoon level (Shils and Janowitz, 1948; 
Marshall, 1947). Additionally, the tactical team tasks requiring multiple 
repetitions to master may benefit from team stability. Much of the 
professional military writing points to the small unit level as being 
impacted the most by personnel turbulence. In contrast, higher echelons 
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above platoon may not receive significant benefit from personnel stability 
because the tasks and relationships are different than lower echelon units. 
(pp. 33–34) 
This is a significant claim and one this research intends to test further. In 
particular, the analysis determines the effect personnel stability has on readiness in the 
Marine Corps, focusing on infantry battalions deploying before and after the 
implementation of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Policy. If the hypothesis holds, then the 
empirical evidence from this research should provide more insight into the extent of this 
phenomenon for Marine infantry battalions. 
Based on the results of Peterson (2008), “the historical and scientific research 
provides evidence that personnel stability may not be required to achieve high levels of 
unit effectiveness” (Peterson, 2008, p. 34). He went on to state that “the deficiency in the 
research is the empirical analysis of the stability-effectiveness relationship” (Peterson, 
2008, p. 34). The analysis in this research is unable to make specific claims about 
cohesion, but the intention of this study is to assess the impact of personnel stability on 
combat readiness for infantry units. This research attempts to isolate personnel stability 
and draw appropriate conclusions based on an understanding of the larger body of work 
on cohesion. Ideally, the research can provide evidence to focus manpower planners on 
the most significant MOSs an infantry battalion needs on-board early in the pre-
deployment schedule to maximize readiness and generate higher quality battalions for the 
Marine Corps. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
“Data serve as the raw material for knowledge and understanding. 
Knowledge and understanding result when human beings add meaning to 
data.” 
—MCDP-6, Command and Control 
(Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1996, p. 56) 
 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
This research attempts to employ quantitative methods to explore the readiness of 
infantry battalions. In order to use these methods, such as descriptive statistics or 
multivariate regression analysis, the empirical analysis requires historical data analogous 
to the components of the problem relating to the research questions. Qualitative research 
is conducted in much the same manner as quantitative research, just with less precision, 
since it also bases its findings on historical context and makes assumptions to test a 
hypothesis.   
This research uses observational data for its empirical analysis. The data collected 
from M&RA, CD&I, and TTECG merged into the master data file is pooled cross 
sectional data that combine the characteristics of time series and cross sectional data. 
Panel data is not possible because each unit does not complete a PTP cycle every year. 
However, the type and characteristics of the data are sufficient for the research being 
conducted in this study. 
On the other hand, the statistical power of the sample is constrained by the 
number of MCCs (36 battalions) on file at TTECG with usable data for the years 2009 to 
2012. The sample is not a random sample of all Marine Corps infantry battalions during 
that period, and it does not contain battalion landing teams (BLTs), reserve battalions, or 
otherwise assigned battalions. While the sample is restricted to active duty Marine Corps 
infantry battalions that completed EMV from 2009 to 2012, this data includes nearly the 
entire population of active duty Marine Corps infantry battalions that completed EMV.  
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1. Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) 
M&RA maintains a manpower data system called the Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TFDW) that  
contains 30 years of historical manpower data from a variety of USMC or 
other DOD systems including MCTFS, MASS, RCCPDS, MCTIMS and 
DEERS, in one location to provide manpower analysts with a 
comprehensive view of a Marine’s career from street to fleet (Total Force 
Data Warehouse, n.d., p. para 1) 
This system serves as the “system of record for historical manpower data” and is the 
“authoritative data source per USC Title 10” for the Marine Corps (Garrick, 2014, p. 3). 
This research uses infantry battalion personnel data from TFDW to provide monthly 
snapshots of on-board strength for each of the battalions in the study.   
To capture the relevant time period for the study, data extracted from the TFDW 
data includes monthly snapshots beginning nine months prior to and ending three months 
after the battalion began EMV for the study. Each monthly snapshot contains aggregate 
data by MOS and grade for on-board personnel in the battalion on the date of the 
snapshot. The original data set from TFDW contains 140,200 observations organized by 
MCC. The process for obtaining this data from M&RA includes providing approval from 
the originating command to conduct research from originating command, certification to 
conduct human subject research from internal review board, and a manpower information 
request submitted through the M&RA website. 
2. Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) 
CD&I serves as the data source for personnel and equipment structure in the 
Marines Corps. This report solicited TFSD for the T/O structure requirements and the 
authorized strength for Marine Corps infantry battalions during 2008–2013. The data set 
contains 42,100 observations arranged by MCC with each Billet Identification Code 
(BIC). Additionally, the data contains numerous other fields including MCC, home 
station, MEF, billet descriptions, ranks, grades, and MOSs. The reason 2008 and 2013 are 
included in this study is to account for a battalion that conducted EMV early in 2009 or 
late in 2012. For those cases, the appropriate structure is available to apply to the on-
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board snapshots from M&RA for the months leading up or following EMV for the 
battalion.  
3. Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group  
TTECG has an internal academics section within the command that is responsible 
for maintaining performance data on EXFORs that participate in the exercise. The scores 
are structured around the individual and collective T&R tasks evaluated for the exercise. 
Each training event is assigned to a Coyote for assessment and scoring. The scores are 
assigned based on the unit’s performance conducting the assigned task and then noted 
within the database file for the exercise that is maintained by the academic’s section. The 
scoring scale for each subtask is based on the following methodology: 1 for untrained, 2 
for partially trained, and a 3 for trained. The final value of the supported T&R task is 
generated by dividing the average of the subtasks by a value of 3, indicating the 
percentage of proficiency the unit demonstrated on that skill. 
The master assessment tool was provided by TTECG academics to support this 
research for the infantry battalions participating in EMV from 2009 to 2012. The 
assessment tool contains the percentages for each battalion organized by MET, collective 
tasks, and subtasks contributing to the total score. The total scores for each battalion were 
used to reflect the dependent variable of readiness for the purposes of this research. Per 
the request from TTECG, unit MCCs have been removed from the output to prevent 
specific units from being identified within the results of this report. 
B. DATA ISSUES AND NORMALIZATION 
A critical component of any empirical analysis is availability of good data relative 
to the research goals. However, data sources always present unique challenges. This 
section details how the data for analysis are derived, what impact their complexities may 
impose on the results of the research, and how the author attempted to resolve these data 
issues. 
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1. Billet Identification Code (BIC) 
The original idea for this study was to use the billet identification code (BIC) to 
group specific personnel into their actual warfighting groups. Unfortunately, there are 
several reasons this level of detail is not possible with the data sources available for this 
research. Following the initial data pull from M&RA, the author discovered 
approximately 50,000 BICs are empty fields for every snapshot produced by TFDW for 
the research. Additionally, a closer examination of the data reveals the BICs that are 
assigned in the TFDW system are potentially highly inaccurate due to the failure of units 
to update those fields as personnel are internally transferred or otherwise re-assigned.   
To resolve the issue with BIC, the researcher turned to the MOS fields to build the 
model. This creates a new set of problems for certain MOSs such as an 0331 machine 
gunner who resides in both a Rifle Company and Weapons Company. This is not 
necessarily an issue for those dealing with structure alone, but it limits the ability of this 
research to analyze specific elements or task-organized units within the battalion (e.g. 
Rifle vs. Weapons Company). As another example, fire support is one of the warfighting 
functions and is also a critical component of the battalion that is evaluated by TTECG 
(i.e., the fire support coordination center [FSCC]). Without BICs, however, it is 
impossible to identify the company commander that is the fire support coordinator in the 
data, typically this would be the Weapons Company Commander. The rest of the FSCC 
has the same issue because that function is assembled from Marines throughout the 
battalion. This research is able to differentiate only the tactical air control party (TACP) 
related to FSCC, and that is because naval aviators possess unique MOSs that are easily 
identified in the data file.   
If monitors assign Marines to a BIC rather than an MCC, then the inability to look 
at specific functions in the battalion would not be an issue for this research. That practice 
removes some of the flexibility of units to place personnel according to their desires in 
task organization, or at least that is likely the complaint battalions would make. MMOA 
and MMEA are in the business of wholesale assignments and battalions are responsible 
for the retail assignments within their respective units. The U.S. Navy has recently 
implemented BIC level assignments with some degree of success. However, one would 
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think that a little communication between the receiving unit and the monitor on the front 
end of the process would alleviate the initial flexibility concerns and provide for more 
efficient tracking of the inventory problem. The other solution is actually the one most 
units might prefer, which is leaving the current assignment practice in place and 
enforcing accountability by implementing reporting requirements to ensure BIC data 
fields are kept up to date. 
2. Impact of Non-Deployables 
According to MCO 3000.13, non-deployables are subtracted from assigned 
strength (on-board) to determine the personnel strength readiness for an infantry 
battalion. However, it is not possible in this data pull to determine the number of non-
deployables carried by each battalion during each monthly (on-board) personnel 
snapshot. In fact, the analysis below reveal several MOSs are well over T/O throughout 
the PTP schedule, and then large numbers are dropped near the deployment dates. 
Carrying large numbers of non-deployable Marines affects the BIC issue as well, since 
there is a limited number of BICs for a battalion’s structure. If BICs are tracked for 
assignment by monitors then units may not receive fills because they appear to be 
overstaffed. The author attempted to account for this issue by requesting access to the 
infantry battalion Deployment Staffing Reports (DSRs) for the periods covered in this 
research, but Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments (MMEA) branch does not 
archive these monthly reports for their records. 
The DSR contains enlisted deployment staffing information for the battalion and 
readily displays data such as the staffing goal, deployables (on-board), non-deployables 
(on-board), and status at lock on date plus 60 (LOD+60). The data in the DSR offers 
valuable insight into the personnel readiness for an infantry battalion. Similar data for 
officers would likely be informative as well. Since this research is unable to determine 
the non-deployable levels in each unit there is an unknown amount of distortion within 
the results. The overall readiness can be ascertained from the data, but the specific level 
of deployable Marines is skewed by the data source. In some cases, DSRs are provided 
by the battalion to TTECG for each exercise. However, due to inconsistent format and 
 46 
submission irregularity the data are not useful to infer non-deployable levels from the 
TTECG data files. On the other hand, to the extent that non-deployables are uniformly 
carried across MCC units and over time, the analysis below can control for these 
challenges in the model. 
3. Percentages for Manning and Staffing 
The CMC guidance provided in MCO 5320.12H provides priorities for manning 
and staffing precedence (CMC, 2012). These priorities are stated as percentages of 
aggregate numbers for officers and enlisted rather than providing specific guidance for 
each MOS in an infantry battalion. This means that it is possible that an infantry battalion 
with a shortage of six infantry platoon commanders produces the same fill percentage as 
a battalion missing six lieutenants in support or staff billets within the battalion. That 
approach is likely to bias the manning and staffing percentages in regards to readiness.   
This issue was also addressed by McHugh et al. (2006), a CNA study that 
proposes including the number a PMOS is over or under structure in addition to the 
current percentage filled metric used by the manpower process (p. 93). The greatest effect 
of this is seen within certain high demand and low density MOSs for infantry battalions. 
If a battalion has only have two intelligence officers, and they are both currently gapped, 
the battalion intelligence warfighting function is significantly degraded, but the fill 
percentage may be acceptable within the guidance of MCO 5320.12H. McHugh et al. 
(2006) provided empirical evidence to support the claim that the current mechanism used 
to determine personnel readiness is an insufficient indicator of unit readiness. 
4. TTECG Data and Scoring 
The data sources provided by the TTECG academics section contains EXFOR 
performance data for the years 2009–2012. Initially, it was the intention of this research 
to analyze infantry battalions from 2001 to present, but that is not possible due to a data 
storage issue that occurred in 2008 where previous records were lost and unavailable to 
retrieve for this research. The usable data provided by TTECG is specific to EMV and 
covers the period 2009–2012, so this report does not contain information on infantry 
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battalions related to the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX), Revised CAX (RCAX), 
Mojave Viper (MV), or the current exercise titled the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX). 
The level of detail in the scores also does not allow the research to account for 
multiple attempts a unit may require to achieve proficiency within a particular task. It is 
not uncommon for a unit to need multiple attempts, time permitting, to achieve their final 
score represented in the master assessment tool. After analyzing the algorithms used in 
the TTECG master assessment tool the author identified instances where a unit was 
assigned a value of “1” for subtasks that they may not have participated in during the 
exercise. This contributes a negative effect on the unit’s overall score. This effect appears 
to be consistent throughout all units, so the author determined that the overall trend in 
scoring is still an acceptable metric. The final data issue is the existence of empty fields 
in the TTECG master assessment tool. In order to remove the effect of these empty fields, 
the author utilized the rowmean() command in the STATA coding software to eliminate 
the effect of these empty fields on the average scores for each MET. The author decided 
not to weight the averages of particular subtasks or collective tasks for the purposes of 
this research. All scores are represented as the mean for that task, excluding empty data 
fields from missing scores in the calculation of the mean.  
C. DATA CONSTRUCTION 
This research uses STATA statistics and data analysis software version 13.1 to 
perform the empirical analysis of the model. The CD&I data file contains the data for 
infantry battalion structure and consists of merged elements from T/O and authorized 
strength. The first step to preparing the data file is to aggregate BICs into the lowest level 
group categories. For instance, to assign observations to a unit group “1,” the researcher 
created variable unit_group=1 if the billet MOS=“0302” and A_GRADE=“LTCOL.” 
That is, the variable “unit group” places the BIC for a battalion commander into the 
command group. Every BIC is thus assigned a specific unit group within the STATA 
program. In order to match those variables with the M&RA data file, a second dummy 
variable named _adj_grade accounts for the 1-up/1-down concept identified in the 
assignment process. This is necessary to account for Marines filling billets above or 
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below the grade specified for the BIC in structure. Dummy variables for _MEF_code and 
_BASEcode account for the parent unit and home station. Once these adjustments are 
complete, the file is saved and named ASRCLEAN. Due to the structure of the data file, 
the data for each year are stripped from ASRCLEAN and saved to a new data file (i.e., 
ASRCLEAN2008). After every year is separated, the years are appended in sequence to 
transform the data in ASRCLEAN from a horizontal or wide format to a vertical or long 
layout. This is necessary to prepare the data to merge with the M&RA data. Finally, the 
unnecessary years and additional variables were dropped to produce the ASRMASTER 
data file. 
TFDW data is contained in a single, text delimited file that is easily uploaded to 
the STATA format. Multiple adjustments, including formatting dates and converting 
string to numeric characters, are executed to align the fields in TFDW data file with those 
found in ASRMASTER. Next, the same _unit_group and _adj_grade dummy variables 
are created in the file to prepare for the merge with ASRMASTER. Finally, the merged 
personnel count data are aggregated to _MCC, _fy, _unit_group, _snapshot, and 
_emv_fy. That is, the data are observed by MCC unit, unit group, snapshot month, and 
FY. This data file is saved as a new file named UNIT_COUNTCLEAN. 
Once the TFDW (on-board) and the CD&I (structure) data file are clean then they 
are ready to merge. With UNIT_COUNTCLEAN as the master file, the information from 
the structure data file ASRMASTER was merged. Observations that did not occur during 
the relevant years for this research are dropped from the file. The new data file is named 
MANPOWER_MASTER. 
The TTECG data was compiled from numerous Excel spreadsheets and combined 
into a single Excel spreadsheet named UNIT_SCORES. This file contains 36 records by 
MCC and a field for each MET, collective task, and subtask for the exercise. Similar to 
the other files, several fields require renaming and dates are formatted to match the 
variables found in MANPOWER_MASTER. Since the author was unable to retrieve the 
actual deployment dates for MCCs, an assumption is made relative to the FGEN process 
that units normally deploy within 60 days of completing EMV (Deputy Commandant for 
Plans, Policies, and Operations, 2013). Using that rule of thumb, the _est_ddate and 
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_PTP_begin variables are created to establish D-180 and D for each MCC. The last step 
to prepare the UNIT_SCORES data file is to calculate each units score for each MET and 
an overall total score for the exercise.  
D. MASTER DATA FILE 
The master data file is created by merging (m:1) MANPOWER_MASTER with 
UNIT_SCORESCLEAN. All observations occurring less than six months prior to the 
unit’s deployment date or more than three months after the unit’s deployment date are 
dropped from the file, resulting in 8,839 observations for analysis. Again, the unit of 
observation is MCC unit, unit group, snapshot month, and FY. This datafile is named 
MASTER_DATA_FILE. 
E. MODELING THE DATA 
Combat readiness is the fundamental concept this research attempts to provide 
insight toward. There are countless factors that one may consider relevant to an analysis 
of readiness. Some are quantifiable and available to the service while others are not. The 
research framework used in this approach provide a unique perspective and opportunities 
for further research on the topic of infantry battalion readiness. The key question that 
leaders and strategic planners must define to manpower planners is the answer to the 
question: “Ready for what?” The answer to that question is vital to achieve unity of effort 
throughout the Marine Corps to optimize readiness. The CMC and FSRG planners in 
Smith (2011) described the “expeditionary force in readiness” in the following way: 
(1)  An integrated and balanced air-ground-logistics team. 
(2) Fwd deployed and fwd engaged—ever ready to respond to the full 
range of crisis and contingencies. 
(3) Responsive and scalable, ready today to respond to the full range of 
crisis and contingencies. 
(4) Trained and equipped to Integrate with other Services, Allies, and 
Interagency partners. 
(5) The USMC is a Middleweight Force…”light enough to get there 
quickly, and heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival.” (p. 5) 
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With these principles in mind, the USMC must provide forces that are ready to respond to 
any crisis it is trained and equipped to handle. Although the DRRS-MC reports offers 
insight and provides certain indicators of infantry battalion readiness, this research 
contends that a battalion’s performance during EMV provides the most holistic picture of 
the unit’s readiness relative to what they are designed to offer the CCDR. Readiness goes 
well beyond simply having the required personnel and equipment on-hand, or the 
judgment of the commander; any discussion of readiness must include a demonstration of 
proficiency and ability of the unit to function as it was designed, as assessed by 
evaluators external to the command. For this reason, EMV scores are used to represent 
the dependent variable of readiness for this research. 
1. Conceptual Framework for the Readiness Model 
The idea for this research is born out of the author’s experience while serving as a 
battalion operations officer during a recent work up and deployment to Afghanistan. The 
battalion commander purposefully required a personnel stabilization date of D-180 in his 
guidance for the battalion’s PTP training plan and his tenacity to pursue its achievement 
made a significant impact on the unit’s readiness for deployment. Following his initial 
guidance, he regularly questioned the battalion XO and S-1 as to the status of inbound 
and outbound personnel. He took specific interest in the internal transferring of personnel 
between billets and enacted battalion policies aimed to curtail those practices. It became 
clear to this researcher that the battalion commander’s belief of the importance of 
personnel stability on unit readiness was vital to the unit’s success during the 
deployment. 
Personnel stability is not central to the author’s responsibilities as the operations 
officer, but the effect on training and preparation was evident in several areas. The act of 
stabilizing personnel by D-180 is critical for the battalion and necessary to prevent the 
highly inefficient practice of “taking 1 step forward and 2 steps backward” during the 
conduct of the PTP. The current manpower assignment process allows monitors to take 
credit for meeting staffing goal when inbound orders are dropped into the system by the 
monitor. That business rule does not account for the time it takes for the Marine to get to 
 51 
the unit, which can be months, and it certainly does not mean the Marine is fully certified 
(school complete, and so on) and ready to perform the job. Monitors are satisfied they are 
fulfilling the manning and staffing precedence order as long as the Marines arrive 
between LOD (D-180) and LOD+60 (D-120) on the battalion’s deployment timeline (see 
Figure 8). This factor, along with horse trading within the division, individual augments, 
and the skills of the inbound Marines, contributes to personnel turbulence within the 
battalion. 
The presence of non-deployable Marines also produces an inaccurate picture of 
personnel readiness for the battalion, and in some cases, adds significant administrative 
burden onto the unit as it prepares to deploy. The counter argument for carrying non-
deployable Marines on the unit roster is to boost readiness numbers for crisis response 
and increase the cohesion of the unit at that time, but those practices are at the expense of 
the cohesion of the deployable personnel. In some ways, personnel readiness and the 
cohesion policy actually seem to work against each other as a battalion prepares for 
deployment. The trade-off is that force is the most prepared to act as a crisis response 
force, but the current Global Response Force (GRF) requirement is not impacted by these 
practices. The USMC GRF battalions are typically not improved as a result of carrying 
non-deployable Marines. 
After considering all of these facts, the author set out to understand the problem 
and developed a model attempting to identify the most significant Marines (by MOS) 
within an infantry battalion relative to readiness. If the USMC and manpower planners 
understand this effect on infantry battalions, then it is possible for manpower planners to 
prioritize these Marines to arrive at an infantry battalion, with the necessary skills, by the 
battalion’s LOD. It is probably too difficult under current manning constraints to shape 
the inventory for all BICs to arrive by LOD. However, adjusting priorities to staff the 
most significant by the LOD would enhance unit readiness levels and enable commanders 








2. Determine the Parameters for the Readiness Model 
This research uses a parametric approach to analyze the data collected. That 
means the research assumes “this pattern holds” or “everything else held constant” for 
each parameter or characteristic in the model. The results of the model are based on the 
historical data collected during the specified years of the research. As technology, 
processes, training standards, or other inputs to the model change the coefficients may 
not accurately represent the effect of the parameter on the dependent variable of 
readiness.  
a. Personnel Parameters 
The personnel parameters in the model are derived by grouping MOSs and grades 
available in the data into several levels for comparison (see Table 9). The personnel 
parameters include all of the BICs for the infantry battalion assigned by structure during 
the year the battalion is evaluated. The lowest level accounted for in the model is focused 
on infantry MOSs and includes the 24 base groups for the study. In order to establish the 
next level of the model, the author used the recode command to group the original MOSs 
into the next category. For instance, _Inf_Capt, _Inf_Msgt, and _Inf_GySgt were 
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combined to create the _Co_staff variable. First Sergeants were placed in the “other” 
category for the purposes of this study because they are not always from an infantry 
occupational specialty in the Marine Corps. 
As previously stated, it was the author’s desire to use more precision in the groups 
used for analysis in this study but the inability to obtain reliable BICs from TFDW data 
led to the stated model personnel parameters. The research tested four groupings of 
personnel to determine the best model based on F-test, p-value and R-squared results 
provided by the STATA software. The best model was selected after comparing the 
results of multiple iterations of the model and sensitivity testing. 




WFF Functional Leadership MOS Unit Groups Description MOS
C2 Cmd Cmd Cmd Cmd 1




Intel Intel Intel Intel Intel 2 S2 0202, 0203, 0231
0302 Inf_Capt 3 Infantry Captains 0302(O3/O3E)
Inf_MSgt 4 Infantry MSgts 0369(E8)
Inf_GySgt 5 Infantry GySgts 0369(E7)
0302 Inf_Lt 6 Infantry Lts 0302(O1/O1E/O2/O2E)
0369 Inf_SSgt 7 Infantry SSgts 0369(E6)
0311 Inf_NCO 8 Infantry NCO 0311(E4-E5)
0331 MG_NCO 9 MG NCO 0331(E4-E5)
0341 Mortar NCO 10 Mortar NCO 0341(E4-E5)
0351 Assault NCO 11 Assault NCO 0351(E4-E5)
0352 Missile NCO 12 Missile NCO 0352(E4-E5)
0311 Infantry 13 Infantryman 0311(E1-E3)
0331 MG 14 Machine Gunner 0331(E1-E3)
0341 Mortar 15 Mortarman 0341(E1-E3)






SSP 0317 SSP 18 Scout Snipers 0317(E1-E6)
Fires TACP TACP TACP TACP 19 AirO, FACs 7502, 7523, 7525, 7563
Admin Admin Admin Admin 20 S1 0102, 0111, 0180, 4821
Logistics Logistics Logistics Logistics
21
S4 0402, 0411, 0431, 2111, 2171, 
2311, 3002, 3043, 3051, 
3381,3521,3529,3531, 3537, 
C2
Comm Comm Comm Comm
22
S6 0602, 0612,0619, 0621, 0629, 
0651, 0659, 0699, 2834, 2841 
2844, 2847, 2862




Other Other Other Other Other 0
1stSgts, Gunner, Bn Ops 












b. Testing Pre-2011 Significance 
The independent variable _pre2011 is used to test the significance of readiness 
scores prior to the implementation of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy. The 
_pre2011 variable is generated following a conditional test that determines whether the 
observation occurs prior to 2011. Once the independent variable is generated, a 
multivariate linear regression model is estimated to measure the significance of the 
independent variables relative to readiness. 
c. Control Variable for Training and Mediating Factors 
Figure 9.  Original Model 
0 1 2011 2 3 4 5 * 6 7 * 8it pre MEFcode BASEcode unitgroup unitgroup asrgap tmonth stable itR d d d d d ASRgap d stable                  
 
[i = group (24), t = month{-6,-5,…0,1,2}, 2011pred =1 if {fy<2011, 0 otherwise}, 
MEFcoded =1 if MEF{IMEF, IIMEF, IIIMEF}, BASEcoded =1 if base{Pendleton, Lejeune, 
Kaneohe, 29 Palms}, unigroupd =1 if group{other,cmd...cbrn}, ASRgap=count-ASR, 
stable=0.9(ASR)] 
Not all Marine Corps infantry battalions are created equally and there are two key 
factors contributing to that effect. Training is directly impacted by two parameters, which 
are both examined in this research. The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) where the 
battalion originated from is the first characteristic used to represent training levels. This 
parameter describes the MEF Commander’s priorities, the standards of training quality in 
the MEF, and the regional focus for operations within the command, relative to readiness. 
The second parameter used in the model representing training levels is the home station 
base for the infantry battalion. This parameter indicates the training opportunities 
available at the base such as ranges, training areas, and other facilities or support relative 
to readiness. Due to a lack of specific data to reflect training proficiency, these control 
variables are used to represent a fixed effect from training relative to readiness. The 
original model contained both independent variables (see Figure 10), but the results from 
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the model showed high collinearity between these two variables. The decision is made to 
use only _BASEcode for subsequent models. 
d. Omitted Variables for Equipment 
The infantry battalions participating in the exercise bring a large logistics 
footprint of equipment and supplies from their consolidated memorandums of receipt and 
supply accounts to use in the exercise. Personal and unit equipment is either self-
transported by the Marine or embarked into shipping containers for commercial transport 
to MCAGCC. The exercise support detachment issues additional equipment to battalions 
for use in the exercise to complete the exercise requirements. These items include 
vehicles, communications equipment, and other mission-specific items required for the 
exercise that units may not own until arriving in theater. By necessity, this research 
assumes all units begin the exercise with the same equipment and that all of the required 
equipment is operational at the time the exercise begins. From personal experience, this is 
a reasonable assumption although an argument can be made to the contrary. Regardless, 
the author is unable to identify a suitable representative parameter to reflect the existing 
variance in equipment relative to equipment readiness for the model. The R & S ratings 
from the DDRS-MC readiness model are omitted variables and accounted for by the error 
term of the model (see Figure 9). 
e. Interaction Terms to Estimate Effect of Group with Staffing Gap 
Figure 10.  Interaction Term Between Unit Group and Staffing Gap 











After examining the results of the original model (see Figure 9), the author set out 
to account for the partial effect of the difference between on-board strength and structure 
requirements. This difference is represented by _gapcount and the differential effect is 
included in the subsequent models through the use of the interaction term between 
_unitgroup and _asrcount (see Figure 10). Including this variable in the model allows the 
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research to not only examine the effect of total personnel numbers on-board, but it also 
allows the research to examine the effect of the difference relative to structure on the 
dependent variable of readiness. Furthermore, the effect of this gap is allowed to vary by 
unit group (MOSs). This allows the research to identify whether there are certain unit 
groups (or MOSs) whose manning relative to structure has relatively more impact on 
readiness than others. 
3. Estimate Parameters in Regression Models 
a. Unit Group Model 
Figure 11.  Unit Group Model 
0 1 2011 2 3 4 * 5 6 * 7it pre BASEcode unitgroup unitgroup asrgap tmonth stable itR d d d d ASRgap d stable                  
[i = group (24), t = month{-6,-5,…0,1,2}, 2011pred =1 if {fy<2011, 0 otherwise}, 
BASEcoded =1 if base{Pendleton, Lejeune, Kaneohe, 29 Palms}, unigroupd =1 if 
group{other,cmd...cbrn}, ASRgap=count-ASR, stable=0.9(ASR)] 
The unit group model estimates the relationship between the independent 
variables (see Figure 11) relative to readiness. The unit group variable arranges the BICs 
for each infantry battalion in groups primarily representing MOS/grade categories (see 
Figure 9). The primary reason for including the grade distinction in this model represents 
the attempt to determine the specific impact of infantry non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) relative to readiness. The emphasis of this research is on infantry MOSs and the 
unit group categories clearly highlight this fact. Although all BICs are present, the model 
arranges the infantry MOSs in more detail to allow the author to closely examine the 
effect of infantry Marines. An opportunity exists to expand this study for the other unit 
groups in the same manner, but that is not the focus of this research. The aggregate effect 
of non-infantry BICs is included to balance the model’s output and account for their 
effect relative to readiness. 
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b. MOS Group Model 
Figure 12.  MOS Group Model 
0 1 2011 2 3 4 * 5 6 * 7it pre BASEcode mosgroup mosgroup asrgap tmonth stable itR d d d d ASRgap d stable                  
[i = group (24), t = month{-6,-5,…0,1,2}, 2011pred =1 if {fy<2011, 0 otherwise}, 
BASEcoded =1 if base{Pendleton, Lejeune, Kaneohe, 29 Palms}, mosgroupd =1 if 
group{other,cmd...cbrn}, ASRgap=count-ASR, stable=0.9(ASR)] 
The primary adjustment made in the MOS group model is the grouping of 
infantry BICs strictly by MOS and removing the separation between NCOs and junior 
enlisted Marines (see Figure 12). The remaining independent variables for the model 
remain the same as the unit group model. The intent of this model is to isolate MOSs and 
determine whether there is a mediating effect from the construct of the unit group model. 
c. Leadership Group Model 
Figure 13.  Leadership Group Model 
0 1 2011 2 3 4 * 5 6 * 7it pre BASEcode leadgroup leadgroup asrgap tmonth stable itR d d d d ASRgap d stable                
 
[i = group (24), t = month{-6,-5,…0,1,2}, 2011pred =1 if {fy<2011, 0 otherwise}, 
BASEcoded =1 if base{Pendleton, Lejeune, Kaneohe, 29 Palms}, leadgroupd =1 if 
group{other,cmd...cbrn}, ASRgap=count-ASR, stable=0.9(ASR)] 
The leadership group model (see Figure 13) approaches the problem by grouping 
the unit groups into specific infantry leadership groups (see Figure 9). The infantry 
leadership groups are designated as the company staff, platoon staff, NCOs, infantry, and 
scout snipers. All other BICs are included within their previously assigned unit groups to 
generate the leadership groups for the model. The intent for this model is to determine the 
effect of specific leadership groups relative to readiness.  
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d. Functional Group Model 
Figure 14.  Functional Group Model 
0 1 2011 2 3 4 * 5 6 * 7it pre BASEcode fxngroup fxngroup asrgap tmonth stable itR d d d d ASRgap d stable                  
[i = group (24), t = month{-6,-5,…0,1,2}, 2011pred =1 if {fy<2011, 0 otherwise}, 
BASEcoded =1 if base{Pendleton, Lejeune, Kaneohe, 29 Palms}, fxngroupd =1 if 
group{other,cmd...cbrn}, ASRgap=count-ASR, stable=0.9(ASR)] 
The functional group model (see Figure 14) is organized to allow the examination 
of the distinction between the company and battalion levels (see Figure 9) relative to 
readiness. Originally, the author intended to use this model differently and arrange the 
BICs into task-organized teams en route to the final model for warfighting functions. Due 
to the data issues associated with BICs values, the approach was adapted to examine the 
different effect between personnel at the company and battalion levels in an infantry 
battalion.  
e. Warfighting Function Model 
Figure 15.  Warfighting Function Model 
0 1 2011 2 3 4 * 5 6 * 7it pre BASEcode wffgroup wffgroup asrgap tmonth stable itR d d d d ASRgap d stable                  
[i = group (24), t = month{-6,-5,…0,1,2}, 2011pred =1 if {fy<2011, 0 otherwise}, 
BASEcoded =1 if base{Pendleton, Lejeune, Kaneohe, 29 Palms}, wffgroupd =1 if 
group{other,C2...FPRO}, ASRgap=count-ASR, stable=0.9(ASR)] 
The warfighting function model (see Figure 15) organizes personnel according to 
their contribution to the observable warfighting functions for this research. According to 
MCDP 1–0, the Marine Corps organizes into six warfighting functions (WFF) for 
planning and execution: command and control (C2), intelligence, maneuver, fires, 
logistics, and force protection (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2011, pp. B1-B3). This 
research examines the effect of each warfighting function relative to readiness. The intent 
of this framework is to determine which WFFs contribute to infantry battalion readiness. 
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4. Interpret the Results from the Models 
The final step in modeling the data is to interpret the results of the models. The 
results of the models indicated the best model for this research is the unit group model. 
The descriptive statistics and regression results are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this 
report. 
F. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The final step in the research methodology is conducting sensitivity analysis on 
the elements used in the various models for the research. It is necessary to determine the 
extent to which omitted variable bias (OVB) is contributing to the models. The intent of 
sensitivity analysis is to look closely at the omitted variables and develop additional tests 
for the potential effects created by omitted variables in the model. The research estimated 
additional regressions to test the stability of TTECG scores and the unit groups used in 
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IV. RESULTS 
“If you torture the data long enough, it will confess” 
—Edward Leamer 
(Leamer, 1978, p. 1) 
 
The only claim one can make with any degree of certainty relating to quantitative 
research is that every empirical model is wrong. Models are not intended to be an exact 
reflection of the state of nature, but are designed to be approximations. The gain to this 
simplification is that empirical models offer particular insight and allow for systematic 
testing of hypothesis. On the other hand, empirical research is fraught with issues in that 
data with missing or omitted variables, so-called noisy variables, incomplete data, 
skewed or non-random samples, or a mis-specified model can lead to biased results. This 
research recognizes these facts, and attempts to analyze the data in the spirit of providing 
useful information toward understanding readiness. Specifically, the models are designed 
to look for opportunities to improve the readiness of infantry battalions in the Marine 
Corps. 
This chapter asks questions of the data to see what it is willing to confess about 
readiness. The chapter begins by examining the distribution of the dependent variable 
across fiscal years. An examination of the scoring trends reflects how well the infantry 
battalions performed during the EMV exercise over time. Recall that the dependent 
variable represents readiness in the sense the unit can perform as it was intended or 
designed (i.e., output-based), not simply based on the presence of the inputs for readiness. 
It seems logical that if one intends to claim a unit is ready then some metric or 
assessment is required to validate the battalion’s claim of readiness. 
Next, the analysis shifts its focus to the determinants of readiness of infantry 
battalions. In particular, the research assesses the impacts of staffing level gaps and 
duration of stability within infantry battalions to get a sense of the direction in which 
these factors influence readiness. This chapter presents the results of estimating the five 
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readiness models described in Chapter III. Each of the models offers a different look at 
the impact of personnel stability on readiness. The findings from the models indicate a 
problem with aggregate metrics currently used to assess manning and staffing levels in 
the Marines Corps. Aggregate metrics obscures the underlying heterogeneity across unit 
groups. Empirical analysis described in more detail below shows that stabilizing certain 
personnel earlier in the PTP period, compared to other groups, is relatively more critical 
in determining readiness as measured by EMV performance. 
A. SCORING TRENDS FOR ENHANCED MOJAVE VIPER 
The summary statistics for the dependent variable _totalScore contains 36 
observations with a sample mean of 0.7485, standard deviation of 0.0447, minimum 
score of 0.6644, and maximum score of 0.8463. The percentage value for _totalScore is 
derived using the methodology explained in Chapter 3 and aggregates the scores for each 
of the five METs based on the averages of the subordinate tasks associated with each 
MET. The total number of tasks assessed by the staff at EMV for the exercise is 574 tasks 
and all of the values for those tasks are included in the _totalScore variable for each 
infantry battalion. 
The distribution of the dependent variable (see Figure 16) represents a normal 
distribution and satisfies the central limit theorem for this analysis. A skewness and 
kurtosis test confirmed the normality of the dependent variable despite the small sample 
size. This means the distribution of the sample averages approximates a normal 
distribution even though the sample size contains fewer than 120 observations. 
A multivariate linear regression of _totalScore on _fy reveals an interesting 
relationship between the average score in each fiscal year (see Table 10). With FY2009 
as the base year, coefficient estimates indicate a decrease in _totalScore on average from 
2009 to 2012. The scatter graph (see Figure 17) plots the _totalScore values for each 
observation and depicts a fitted line minimizing the sum of squared errors (SSE). The 
fitted line reveals the decreasing trend of the dependent variable across the fiscal years. 
There are several possible explanations for this result, such as the annual turnover of 
Coyotes at TTECG, increases in grading standards on evaluated tasks, or a general 
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decrease in the proficiency of the infantry battalions conducting the exercise during those 
years. It is not within the scope of this research to determine causality, but it is important 
to note the downward trend in scoring. 
In addition, seven infantry battalions observed in this research produced a below-
average total score (see Figure 18) for the exercise. Due to limitations of the data, it is 
unclear whether these units had sufficient time following the exercise to correct their 
deficiencies before deployment. The pressing question our leaders must answer is a 
difficult one – were these battalions ready? It is highly likely operational tempo dictates a 
battalion deploys whether it is ready or not. An interesting study might include further 
research on the performance of these below-average battalions during their deployments. 
There are many factors that may cause an infantry battalion to score below 
average. Recall that some battalions may have made multiple attempts on these tasks, and 
that these scores do not reflect potential multiple attempts. It is thus possible additional 
battalions might fall into the category scoring below average. That is, some battalions 
actually scored much lower than reported, but were given the highest score among 
multiple event attempts. Additionally, depending on the fiscal year, the battalion score for 
the exercise may reflect variation from the evaluators due to transfer or re-assignment. 
The bottom line, however, is that these factors have a uniform or equal effect on each 
battalion in the research. As such, issues such as a different group of evaluators from year 
to year are not likely to bias findings, particularly since the analysis controls for time 
period. What this research attempts to highlight is the contribution of personnel stability 
to the outcome of readiness as measured by EMV scores, holding all else constant. 
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Figure 16.  EMV Distribution of Total Scores 
 







_totalScore     
Independent Variables 
Fiscal Years 
_Ify_2010 fy==2010 -0.0167*** 
    [0.0012] 
_Ify_2011 fy==2011 -0.0332*** 
    [0.0011] 
_Ify_2012 fy==2012 -0.0681*** 
    [0.0013] 
Constant 0.7759*** 
    [0.0009] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.262 
Standard errors in brackets 
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Figure 17.  EMV Scoring Trend Analysis 
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B. ANALYSIS OF STABILIZED TRAINING TIME BEFORE 
DEPLOYMENT 
Measuring personnel stability for infantry battalions is one of the key concepts of 
this research. One way to identify stability is empirically determining the month in the 
PTP cycle during which an infantry battalion achieves stability. To do so, one has to 
make a logical assumption as to what it actually means for an infantry battalion to be 
stable. To begin, this research assigns a value _stable=1 to the month unit groups in the 
infantry battalion reach 90% of its authorized strength. There are many alternative 
empirical definitions for stability, such as: the time on station for a particular Marine, the 
duration a Marine spends in his or her assigned billet, or the amount of time a group of 
individuals spends together prior to deployment. Due to limitations of the data, this 
research is unable to assess stability using individual metrics such as the ones listed 
above. Such level of detail was in fact requested for this research through BICs, but as 
previously discussed the BIC data is not a reliable data field to use for this research. 
Currently, the Marine Corps does not have sufficient detail in TFDW to observe stability 
on an individual basis.  
To empirically identify the window during the PTP period that units achieve 
stability, defined as achieving 90% of ASR, the researcher estimates a probit model (see 
Figure 19). The model fits the data to predict the likelihood of stability using a non-linear 
model (see Table 11). The coefficients generated from the model indicate significance 
and a positive direction beginning at tmonth=-4 relative to the base month tmonth=-6, but 
the magnitude of the effect cannot be determined without further calculation. The 
marginal effects (see Table 12) indicate a significance increase of 0.0414 in the 
probability that a battalion stabilizes in tmonth=-4 relative to the base month, all else held 
constant. To test whether battalions are just as likely to attain stability in tmonth=-4 vs 
tmonth=-5, to the researcher tested the hypothesis that tmonth=-4 is equal to tmonth=-5 is 
equal to zero. The results of this test fail to reject the null hypothesis 
(prob>chi2=0.1418); that is, there is insufficient statistical evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that battalions are just as likely to attain stability in tmonth=-4 as -5. Next, the 
hypothesis test is modified to test whether battalions are just as likely to attain stability in 
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tmonth==-4 vs tmonth==-3. This null hypothesis is rejected (prob>chi2=0.0275). 
Together the tests show that on average, infantry battalions are statistically likely to 
stabilize only between D-120 and D-90 based on the definition of stability (90% of ASR). 
If battalions stabilize only within this window, it suggests the HRDP is 
underperforming relative to stability. The HRDP may not possess the necessary inventory 
to complete the pre-deployment buildup of personnel for infantry battalions according to 
the current target window. It is also possible that certain high demand low density MOS 
pipelines are not programmed to allow monitors to meet this requirement. The bottom 
line is that the staffing and assignment process is performing outside the desired window 
LOD (D-180) to L+60 (D-120) to stabilize deploying units, and this window is notably 
outside the parameters stated in the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy. This finding 
presents evidence that the Marine Corps needs to look at the manning and staffing 
process to determine causality for this issue. 
It is also possible the definition of stability for this research and the measure of 
stability by unit groups contributes to this negative outcome. Each unit group is organized 
by MOS’s and not as aggregate values for officers and enlisted as stated in MCO 
5320.12H (CMC, 2012). The HRDP delivers according to the guidance found in MCO 
5320.12H, but this research presents evidence that those guidelines may be insufficient to 
provide stable infantry battalions with sufficient training time prior to deployment. 
Figure 19.  Probit Regression for Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stability 
0 1Pr( 1) ( * _ )it tstable d tmonth      
(i = battalion, t = {-6,-5,…0,1,2},  = Probit function, 1t = 9x1 vector of coefficients) 
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VARIABLES LABELS Probit 1 
Dependent Variable 
stable 0.90 * ASR   
Independent Variables 
Month Relative to Deployment 
_Itmonth_2 tmonth==-5 0.0510 
    [0.0632] 
_Itmonth_3 tmonth==-4 0.1253** 
    [0.0637] 
_Itmonth_4 tmonth==-3 0.1629** 
    [0.0639] 
_Itmonth_5 tmonth==-2 0.1993*** 
    [0.0641] 
_Itmonth_6 tmonth==-1 0.1922*** 
    [0.0641] 
_Itmonth_7 tmonth==0 0.1376** 
    [0.0637] 
_Itmonth_8 tmonth==1 0.1155* 
    [0.0635] 
_Itmonth_9 tmonth==2 0.0884 
    [0.0634] 
_Itmonth_10 tmonth==3 0.0817 








Standard errors in brackets 











stable 0.90 * ASR   
Independent Variables 
Change in P(stabilized) Relative to Base 
Month 
_Itmonth_2 tmonth==-5 0.0172 
    [0.0210] 
_Itmonth_3 tmonth==-4 0.0414** 
    [0.0204] 
_Itmonth_4 tmonth==-3 0.0533*** 
    [0.0200] 
_Itmonth_5 tmonth==-2 0.0646*** 
    [0.0197] 
_Itmonth_6 tmonth==-1 0.0624*** 
    [0.0197] 
_Itmonth_7 tmonth==0 0.0453** 
    [0.0202] 
_Itmonth_8 tmonth==1 0.0382* 
    [0.0204] 
_Itmonth_9 tmonth==2 0.0295 
    [0.0207] 
_Itmonth_10 tmonth==3 0.0273 
    [0.0207] 
Observations 8,597 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
C. STABILITY AND STAFFING LEVELS RELATIVE TO DEPLOYED 
UNIT STAFFING COHESION POLICY 
The Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy is designed to stabilize units 
throughout the entire PTP cycle beginning at D-180 and for a minimum of 90 days 
following deployment (DC M&RA, 2011). Several metrics can define stability such as 
the threshold described in the previous section. Another metric involves measuring the 
change in stability relative to the implementation of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing 
policy. This research observes this effect based on staffing levels before and after 2011 to 
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get a sense of the performance of the system relative to the new policy guidance. This 
research recognizes the magnitude of implementing manpower policy, and understands 
that the manpower process cannot completely turn the ship quite as fast as called for in 
this instance. It may take several years to realize the effects of shifts in manpower policy. 
While the time period after the policy was implemented included in this data sample is 
relatively narrow, it is still sufficient to detect whether or not the new policy guidance is 
implemented. 
This section begins with another probit regression to predict the probability of 
stabilization in relation to FY2011 (see Figure 20). The intent is to assess to initial impact 
of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy. The coefficient on the variable 
_Ipre2011_1 is -0.0911 (see Table 13) and predicts a negative direction for stability 
relative to FY2011. This output indicates an infantry battalion is less likely to be stable 
prior to 2011. The marginal effects confirm the value of the coefficient is -0.0310 and 
represents the probability a battalion is stable prior to 2011 (see Table 14). The final step 
in this analysis is to confirm the statistical significance of the probability that a battalion 
is stable post-2011. This is accomplished by testing the marginal effects [margins, 
at(_Ipre2011_1=0)] resulting in a p-value of 0.0000 and a conditional probability of 
0.7283. This means battalions are 72.83% more likely to be stabilized during the period 
the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy is in place, relative to before the order. 
In addition to estimating the change in stability, the research examines the staffing 
levels of each infantry battalion to identify trends between structure and on-board levels. 
It appears the staffing levels gradually tightened toward authorized strength during each 
of the successive years of the study (see Figure 21). In aggregate numbers, all infantry 
battalions remain well above authorized strength (~890) and appear to be on solid footing 
from a personnel perspective. However, these aggregate numbers mask an underlying 
pattern. The numbers on personnel stability are remarkable as one descends from a 
30,000 feet perspective and observes the staffing levels relative to authorized strength by 
the unit groups defined in this research. 
The gap between authorized strength and on-board staffing by unit group are 
presented in Figure 22. On average, each infantry battalion appears to possess 102 
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infantrymen above authorized strength. This excess capacity skews the aggregate 
numbers for every infantry battalion and masks the staffing deficiencies in other areas. 
Furthermore, the negative coefficient on many overstaffed categories indicates 
diminishing returns on readiness from this practice. According to the data, there are 
consistent and significant shortages for every battalion in the following occupational 
specialties: intelligence, weapons platoon/company NCOs, scout snipers, and 
administration Marines. Upon closer look relative to FY2011, the data shows some 
improvement for intelligence, scout snipers, and administration Marines but reveals 
increasing shortages for weapons platoon/company NCOs. These patterns suggest that a 
problem may exist in these MOS pipelines requiring more research to determine the 
cause of these shortages (see Figure 23).  
Figure 20.  Probit Regression for Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stability 
Relative to FY2011 
0 1Pr( 1) ( * _ * _ 2011)it tstable d tmonth d pre      
(i = battalion, t = {-6,-5,…0,1,2},  = Probit function, 1t = 9x1 vector of coefficients) 
Table 13.   Probability the Month an Infantry Battalion Stabilized Changes 
Relative to FY2011 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Probit 2 
Dependent Variable 
stable 0.90 * ASR   
Independent Variables 
Month Relative to Deployment 
_Itmonth_2 tmonth==-5 0.0485 
    [0.1062] 
_Itmonth_3 tmonth==-4 0.0452 
    [0.1026] 
_Itmonth_4 tmonth==-3 0.1115 
    [0.1016] 
_Itmonth_5 tmonth==-2 0.1389 
    [0.0993] 
_Itmonth_6 tmonth==-1 0.1036 




VARIABLES LABELS Probit 2 
_Itmonth_7 tmonth==0 0.0462 
    [0.0964] 
_Itmonth_8 tmonth==1 -0.0151 
    [0.0950] 
_Itmonth_9 tmonth==2 0.0075 
    [0.0952] 
_Itmonth_10 tmonth==3 -0.0286 
    [0.0941] 
Relationship to 2011 
_Ipre2011_1 pre2011==1 -0.0911 
    [0.0933] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXpre_2_1 tmonth==-5 & pre2011==1 0.0038 
    [0.1322] 
_ItmoXpre_3_1 tmonth==-4 & pre2011==1 0.1280 
    [0.1311] 
_ItmoXpre_4_1 tmonth==-3 & pre2011==1 0.0781 
    [0.1311] 
_ItmoXpre_5_1 tmonth==-2 & pre2011==1 0.0946 
    [0.1312] 
_ItmoXpre_6_1 tmonth==-1 & pre2011==1 0.1516 
    [0.1311] 
_ItmoXpre_7_1 tmonth==0 & pre2011==1 0.1660 
    [0.1309] 
_ItmoXpre_8_1 tmonth==1 & pre2011==1 0.2696** 
    [0.1315] 
_ItmoXpre_9_1 tmonth==2 & pre2011==1 0.1452 
    [0.1307] 
_ItmoXpre_10_1 tmonth==3 & pre2011==1 0.2274* 
    [0.1317] 
Constant 0.5067*** 




Standard errors in brackets 











Stable 0.90 * ASR   
Independent Variables 
Change in P(stabilized) Relative to Base Month 
_Itmonth_2 tmonth==-5 0.0163 
    [0.0353] 
_Itmonth_3 tmonth==-4 0.0152 
    [0.0342] 
_Itmonth_4 tmonth==-3 0.0369 
    [0.0327] 
_Itmonth_5 tmonth==-2 0.0457 
    [0.0315] 
_Itmonth_6 tmonth==-1 0.0344 
    [0.0320] 
_Itmonth_7 tmonth==0 0.0155 
    [0.0321] 
_Itmonth_8 tmonth==1 -0.00516 
    [0.0325] 
_Itmonth_9 tmonth==2 0.00254 
    [0.0323] 
_Itmonth_10 tmonth==3 -0.00979 
    [0.0324] 
Relationship to 2011 
_Ipre2011_1 pre2011==1 -0.0310 
    [0.0317] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXpre_2_1 tmonth==-5 & pre2011==1 0.00130 
    [0.0449] 
_ItmoXpre_3_1 tmonth==-4 & pre2011==1 0.0421 
    [0.0416] 
_ItmoXpre_4_1 tmonth==-3 & pre2011==1 0.0260 
    [0.0428] 
_ItmoXpre_5_1 tmonth==-2 & pre2011==1 0.0314 
    [0.0424] 
_ItmoXpre_6_1 tmonth==-1 & pre2011==1 0.0495 
    [0.0409] 
_ItmoXpre_7_1 tmonth==0 & pre2011==1 0.0539 
    [0.0404] 







    [0.0377] 
_ItmoXpre_9_1 tmonth==2 & pre2011==1 0.0475 
    [0.0409] 
_ItmoXpre_10_1 tmonth==3 & pre2011==1 0.0725* 
    [0.0389] 
Observations 8,597 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 21.  Average On-Board Staffing Levels in Estimated Deployment 
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D. READINESS REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS 
The initial questions presented to the data reveal interesting trends related to the 
readiness and staffing metrics. In this section multivariate regression models relate the 
staffing metrics and stability to readiness. The results in this section represent select 
partial results from the readiness regression models of the significant variables for 
discussion. The complete results for each regression model are listed in the appendix. 
Readiness is as previously defined and reflects a battalion’s ability to perform its 
assigned METs. However, performing this task adequately indicates a battalion has the 
quantities of personnel, training, and equipment (i.e., inputs) prescribed in the readiness 
function. In addition, the output-based test score measure demonstrates the battalion’s 
capacity to integrate its warfighting functions and perform to the standards outlined in the 
T&R manual. The critical component enabling a battalion to perform to this standard is 
the proficiency and cohesion of its human resources–the Marines in the battalion. 
1. Unit Group Model 
The unit group model proves the best-fitting model in this research. The 
significant independent variables relative to personnel are 0369 GySgts, 0302 Lts, 0369 
SSgts, 0341 NCOs, 0331 machine gunners, and 0341 mortar men (see Table 15). 
Interestingly, each of these unit group categories correspond to the platoon level of 
Marine Corps infantry battalion task organization. The exception to this rule is the 0369 
GySgt who may function as a platoon sergeant or a company gunnery sergeant. The 
results of the model combined with the data relating the gap between on-board strength 
and structure (see Figure 21) show significant shortages in certain critical MOSs, and that 
these have a significant impact on infantry battalion readiness. 
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Table 15.   Unit Group Model Results (Model 1) 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 1 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0357*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0296*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0330*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0536*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion Unit Groups 
_Iunit_grou_5 Inf_GySgts 0.0110** 
    [0.0050] 
_Iunit_grou_6 Inf_Lts -0.0103** 
    [0.0044] 
_Iunit_grou_7 Inf_SSgts -0.0112** 
    [0.0048] 
_Iunit_grou_10 Mortar_NCO -0.0070* 
    [0.0038] 
_Iunit_grou_14 MG -0.0102** 
    [0.0043] 
_Iunit_grou_15 Mortar -0.0126*** 
    [0.0043] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0005 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_IuniXASRg_4 (unit_group==4)*ASRgap -0.0107*** 
    [0.0042] 
_IuniXASRg_5 (unit_group==5)*ASRgap -0.0033*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IuniXASRg_6 (unit_group==6)*ASRgap 0.0024** 
    [0.0012] 
_IuniXASRg_9 (unit_group==9)*ASRgap -0.0015* 
    [0.0009] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 1 
    [0.0023] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0046** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_6 (tmonth==-1)*stable 0.0050** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0066*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0079*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0081*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0087*** 
    [0.0021] 
Constant 0.7603*** 
    [0.0033] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.320 
Adjusted R^2 0.315 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
2. MOS Group Model 
The MOS group model is designed to align the model toward the MOSs maintained 
in an infantry battalion. This begins the trend toward aggregated groups and presents more 
homogeneity in the model. Despite the increased homogeneity, the scout snipers MOS 
proves to be a significant independent variable in the model (see Table 16). This provides 
evidence that the staffing of high-demand low-density specialties such as the scout snipers 
is significant to the overall readiness of an infantry battalion. Additionally, the shortages of 
these Marines (see Figure 21) compounds the issue relating to readiness. The overall effect, 
or significance of the findings, revealed by the unit group and MOS group models is 
masked as the models progress toward more aggregate groups. This highlights the 
relevance of including a PMOS metric related to readiness as proposed by McHugh et al. 
(2006) in their assessment of officer shortages in the Marine Corps. 
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Table 16.   MOS Group Model Results (Model 2) 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 2 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0356*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0288*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0324*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0532*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion MOS Groups 
_Imos_group_10 SSP -0.0138** 
    [0.0068] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0014 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_ImosXASRg_10 (mos_group==10)*ASRgap -0.0021** 
    [0.0010] 
_ImosXASRg_13 (mos_group==13)*ASRgap -0.0018* 
    [0.0010] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
Stable stable -0.0122*** 
    [0.0021] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0046** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_6 (tmonth==-1)*stable 0.0050** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0065*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0078*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0079*** 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0086*** 





VARIABLES LABELS Model 2 
    [0.0033] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.312 
Adjusted R^2 0.308 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
3. Leadership Group Model 
The leadership group model contains one significant leadership group relating to 
readiness (see Table 17). The platoon staff independent variable is a combination of the 
0369 SSgt and the 0302 Lt from the unit group model. Interestingly, this finding is 
consistent with previous results indicating staffing gaps at the platoon level as the most 
significant contribution to readiness. This is also consistent with the research by Peterson 
(2008), Siebold (2011), and Bassford (1990) who all point toward the significance of 
stability at the lowest level relative to readiness.   
It is also important to note the lack of significance in command group stability. 
This is consistent with the research conducted by Peterson (2008) who also found little 
evidence to support a significant contribution from command group stability toward 
readiness. That the command group is not significant may be attributed to the Marine 
Corps practice of screening and assigning battalion commanders and command sergeants 
major to units early in the PTP. The only real variance in the command group variable is 
contained in the battalion XO and operations officers who are the other components in 
the command group for this study. 
The lack of significance in the infantry NCO independent variable is a notable 
surprise to the author. The infantry NCO is the one leadership group the author expected 
to appear significant in this model. A possible explanation may be the on-average, above 
structure on-board staffing numbers (see Figure 21). However, leaning on personal 
experience, shortages of these Marines in infantry battalions seem the rule and not the 
exception. This is partially attributed to infantry NCOs requiring school during the PTP 
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cycle and being unavailable to train with their Marines. Another possible explanation 
may be that Marines filling in for the infantry NCOs are doing as well as the infantry 
NCOs. That claim requires more research and if proven true, adds credibility to the 
current initiative to make the infantry NCO a formal MOS designed to improve the 
proficiency of Marines performing that billet. The bottom line is the data analysis shows 
staffing gaps in the infantry NCO are not significant. This also indicates a low 
contribution to readiness for infantry battalions for the leadership group. 
Table 17.   Leadership Groups Model Results (Model 3) 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 3 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0359*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0289*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0324*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0532*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion Leadership Groups 
_Ilead_grou_4 Plt_staff -0.0083** 
    [0.0038] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0007 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_IleaXASRg_4 (lead_group==4)*ASRgap 0.0010 
    [0.0010] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
Stable stable -0.0073*** 
    [0.0021] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0047** 
    [0.0021] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 3 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0065*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0078*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0078*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0085*** 
    [0.0022] 
Constant 0.7608*** 
    [0.0032] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.313 
Adjusted R^2 0.310 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4. Functional Group Model 
The functional group model continues to aggregate the unit groups within the 
battalion into functional groups in the battalion. The intent for this model is to determine 
if any functional groups are significant relative to the research question. The results of 
this model did not reveal any significant functional groups within the battalion (see Table 
18). This outcome is likely the result of diminishing heterogeneity in the data and masked 
effects of personnel stability on readiness. The functional groups that appear behind 
infantry in the model (although not statistically significant) are intelligence and logistics 
which seems consistent with the expectations of the research. 
Table 18.   Functional Group Model Results (Model 4) 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 4 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 4 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0357*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0285*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0320*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0530*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion Functional Groups 
None   
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0008 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
None   
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
Stable stable -0.0078*** 
    [0.0019] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0047** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_6 (tmonth==-1)*stable 0.0050** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0064*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0076*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0076*** 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0084*** 
    [0.0022] 
Constant 0.7610*** 
    [0.0032] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.309 
Adjusted R^2 0.307 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Warfighting Function Model 
The warfighting function model is based on the doctrinal Marine Corps 
warfighting functions (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2011) and is designed to 
determine whether there are any significant issues of personnel stability related to 
readiness in these categories. The warfighting function model did not yield any 
significant results for warfighting function groups relative to readiness. These results 
suggest that all of the warfighting functions are sufficiently stabilized with personnel 
which is misleading based on the previous models. 
Table 19.   Warfighting Functions Model Results (Model 5) 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 5 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0358*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0285*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0319*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0529*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion Warfighting Function Groups 
None   
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0007 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
None   
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
Stable stable -0.0072*** 
    [0.0018] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0046** 
    [0.0021] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 5 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0063*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0075*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0076*** 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0084*** 
    [0.0022] 
Constant 0.7606*** 
    [0.0032] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.309 
Adjusted R^2 0.307 
Standard errors in brackets 













“The Marine Corps is devoted to an expeditionary way of life. Marines 
understand that true readiness means much more than being 
deployable…This agile force can react rapidly across the range of 
military operations and must prevail, even thrive, in the uncertainty and 
chaos of emerging crisis.” 
—MCDP 1–0, Marine Corps Operations  
(Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2011, p. 2–19) 
 
A. SUMMARY 
The United States Marine Corps is the nation’s premier middleweight 
expeditionary force in readiness (CMC, 2015). It is imperative to protect this strength and 
continue to provide forces ready to respond to future conflicts. This research focuses on 
understanding the determinants of readiness, particularly the readiness of infantry 
battalions, and how personnel stability contributes to this readiness. 
The author’s understanding of readiness has evolved over the course of this 
research. The phrase “expeditionary force in readiness” means more than just preparing 
for deployment. Readiness in the Marine Corps is readiness at all times, that is, it is able 
to provide forces in response to unforeseen crises and contingency operations. However, 
this state of continuous readiness introduces inefficiencies with respect to infantry 
battalion’s preparations for planned deployments. This includes diminishing returns from 
carrying high numbers of non-deployable Marines, continuous personnel turbulence due 
to internal and external transfers throughout the PTP cycle, and possibly a negative 
overall effect of cohesion within the unit preparing for deployment. Trade-offs are 
necessary given the Marine Corps’ resource constraints, so perhaps the Marine Corps 
approach to readiness is optimal in that sense. However, it has to be acknowledged that 
the gaps in personnel staffing of infantry battalions preparing for deployment are 
associated with improperly trained units that are not cohesive, and thus unable to 
optimally function as intended once deployed. 
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Another interesting finding in the research involves the mismatches between the 
factors of certain inputs of the force generation process. The methodology and metrics 
used to optimize utilization for personnel, training, and equipment may not tell the 
complete story of readiness. Specifically, the research presents some evidence that using 
aggregate metrics relative to officers and enlisted may be insufficient to adequately 
stabilize units preparing for deployment. It answers part of the question and certainly 
offers insight into potential problems, but the actual answer to stability resides in the 
more specific comparison of staffing billet MOSs relative to on-board Marines by PMOS. 
The stated goal of the HRDP is to “get the right Marines, to the right place, at the right 
time, with the right skills” (Strobl, 2005, p. 1). This research suggests the current 
manpower policies and business rules for assignment of personnel are underperforming 
in this goal. Systematic data analysis shows the predicted timeframe a Marine Corps 
infantry battalion stabilizes occurs between D-90 and D-120, slightly outside the desired 
target for M&RA and definitely beyond the target specified in the Deployed Unit 
Cohesion Staffing policy of D-180. 
 The Marine Corps describes force planning as “planning that is associated with 
the creation and maintenance of military capabilities” (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 
1997, p. 53). The performance of the force planning function relies on the effectiveness 
of the Marine Corps to coordinate and integrate the foundational pillars of “training, 
education, doctrine, organization, personnel management, and equipment acquisition” 
(Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997, p. 54). Similar to Horowitz (1986) description 
of the relationship between the four principle factors of readiness, this research suggests 
an interactive element between personnel readiness, or stability, and the other factors in 
the model. This research supports the argument that personnel factors impact the other 
factors described as the pillars of force planning (see Figure 24). 
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Figure 24.  Components of Force Planning 
 
Adapted from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. (1997). Warfighting (MCDP-1). 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59 
/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf 
The bottom line for the evaluation of the impact of personnel management on 
readiness is the understanding that stability matters. The research offers evidence that 
stability is statistically significant in determining readiness. This finding is consistent 
with previous research, the warfighting concepts in Marine Corps doctrine, and the 
guidance provided in the Marine Corps unit cohesion program. In addition, readiness 
would benefit from a clearly defined metric for stability within the Marine Corps. This 
research suggests a clearly defined metric for stability could serve to focus the complex 
manning and staffing processes and informs the prioritization of staffing critical MOSs 
for infantry battalions in the Marine Corps. There is a relationship between personnel 
management, stability, cohesion, and performance that could be improved beyond the 
current outcomes produced by the HRDP. Finally, and on a positive note, the research 
suggests the implementation of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy in 2011 did 
improve stability for infantry battalions. 
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The Marine Corps’ future excellence as a force provider of “expeditionary forces 
in readiness” is only guaranteed through continued cross-examination of its policies and 
processes supporting force planning. It is beneficial to preserve a healthy amount of 
institutional paranoia in this area to ensure the Marine Corps continues to get it right. The 
importance of readiness as a center of gravity for the Marine Corps is given additional 
perspective by analogies from Collins (2001) who describes the importance of 
organizations to act like a “hedgehog” and cultivate their “flywheel” (Collins, 2001). This 
research suggests the Marine Corps must approach readiness as its single organizing idea 
that it can do better than anyone else in the world (Collins, 2001). The human resources 
for the Marine Corps are the flywheel, which is explained as the mechanism used to build 
momentum for the organization over the long term. These two concepts from Collins 
(2001) demonstrate the importance of continuing to improve the personnel management 
policies in the Marine Corps. The success of the Marine Corps in future conflicts may 
depend on how well the organization manages the flywheel. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In conclusion, readiness is not improved simply by random aggregate increases in 
quantities of personnel, training, and equipment. The quality of the force, or its readiness, 
requires more scrutiny and cross-examination to determine if an infantry battalion can 
function as it was designed. In this sense, having more personnel is not always better and 
the data in this research indicate this finding is true. So, is the Marine Corps ready for 
future conflicts? The answer to that question requires knowing what types of conflicts the 
Marine Corps may face in the future. Regardless of the actual event, the data from this 
research suggest the current approach to readiness provides a sub-optimal solution. The 
predicted readiness scores increase by 0.04 (or one standard deviation) when a battalion 
is stabilized at D-120 vs the current practice of D-90 relative to the base month (D-180). 
This degree of improvement is significant relative to the ideas presented by lean thinking 
and six sigma process improvements. 
Although, the current model is based on flexibility it fails to provide the best 
infantry battalion to respond to crises or to generate the best infantry battalion to conduct 
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a deliberate deployment. This approach has been sufficient to deal with non-state actors, 
but it could prove problematic if the Marine Corps is asked to respond to near peer 
competition where the competitive advantage of technology is neutralized. The results of 
this research suggest the HRDP is overextended in relation to its assigned mission. The 
primary way to resolve this tension is to increase the inventory of Marines or decrease the 
existing structure for infantry battalions. In the absence of these measures, this research 
offers evidence that stabilizing specific MOS categories earlier in the PTP provides 
marginal improvement to readiness. 
This section presents the conclusions and recommendations organized by the 
research questions. The conclusions of this research are derived from the empirical 
analysis of these questions. The first question involves analyzing the current readiness 
model and determining the appropriate inputs for infantry battalion readiness. The second 
question involves analysis of the metrics used to determine infantry battalion readiness. 
This question includes analysis of the impact of the Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing 
policy on infantry battalion stability. The final question involves analysis to determine 
the statistically significant occupational specialties that are essential to stabilize early in 
the PTP cycle for an infantry battalion. The conclusions and recommendations for these 
questions offer insight into the effectiveness of the Marine Corps manning and staffing 
policies and potential areas for improvement in the HRDP.  
After analysis of the existing readiness model, this research suggests it may 
benefit the Marine Corps to include additional fields such as Division or TECOM 
evaluated events in the readiness function to capture ability to perform as intended (see 
Figure 1). It may also benefit the readiness model to include a stability metric in addition 
to the existing aggregate levels reported in DRRS-MC. This research suggests that is 
necessary to fully understand the personnel readiness of an infantry battalion. As the 
quote opening this chapter suggests, readiness is more than a simple measure of the 
ability for an infantry battalion to deploy. In order to achieve a more accurate picture of 
infantry battalion readiness the Marine Corps could improve the training and personnel 
metrics used for reporting in the DRRS-MC system. 
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There is an opportunity for significant improvement regarding the metrics used to 
determine infantry battalion readiness. After analysis of the data from TTECG, this 
research believes the Marine Corps would benefit from adding analytics sections to 
Training and Education Command (TECOM) structure. The data collected by TTECG 
provides the research a unique ability to assess the performance of Marine Corps infantry 
battalions in the integration across all of the warfighting functions. However, the data 
used for this research was incomplete and contained various calculation errors and 
incomplete data for each battalion. This fact is not the result of a lack of effort by TTECG 
to collect data on EXFOR battalions, but is a result of a lack of staffing and support for 
this vital function within the command. Similar to professional sports, this research 
believes adding support for analytics in TECOM commands has the potential to improve 
training trend analysis, real-time feedback and critiques, after action reviews for 
participating units, and serves to focus the Block V remediation training prior to 
deployment. Critics would argue this might provide a mechanistic solution to 
performance, but this research suggests that the Marine Corps would benefit from more 
precise information from these exercises. 
This research also confirms the findings of McHugh et al. (2006) describing the 
problem aggregate metrics contribute to shortages of personnel. The Marine Corps may 
benefit from including a metric to account for on-board staffing relative to PMOS in 
addition to the current aggregate metric relative to officers and enlisted. The result of the 
current policy masks the effects caused by overstaffing certain MOS categories. When a 
battalion is overstaffed by ~102 basic infantrymen the aggregate metric can present a 
stabilized enlisted percentage even though several critical MOSs may be short or missing 
altogether. In order to track this recommendation, the Marine Corps has to resolve the 
inaccuracy of BIC assignments. Under current practices, the BIC is underutilized and 
inaccurate to the point that it is an unusable field for tracking individual assignments. 
Unit commanders are responsible for this data and must ensure these records are accurate. 
This finding significantly degraded the ability to determine stability for infantry 
battalions in this research. 
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The final metric presenting a problem relative to the stability of infantry battalions 
is the target fill window used to guide monitor assignments. As long as monitors get 
credit for assigning Marines to infantry battalions between LOD and LOD+60 the 
Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy will not achieve the maximum potential relative 
to unit cohesion and stabilization. This research is not opposed to the existence of a 
window, that seems reasonable due to the complexity of the manning and staffing 
process. However, it is the location of the window that is problematic. The result of the 
current target window does not specifically affect readiness as currently defined, but 
research suggests it does have a negative impact on personnel stability and cohesion. This 
research recognizes many factors such as shifting or unpredictable deployment schedules 
and school graduation cycles constrain a monitor’s ability to achieve this goal. Further 
research is required to confirm the feasibility of this recommendation, but the results of 
this study suggest looking into the impact of shifting the window to the left on the PTP 
timeline to align with the intent of the force generation process and the Deployed Unit 
Cohesion Staffing policy to improve readiness (see Figure 25). 
Figure 25.  Recommended Staffing Target Window 
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personnel turnover is the current practice of assigning Marines to units that require follow 
on education to possess “the right skills” (Strobl, 2005). The readiness of an infantry 
battalion may benefit from reduced turbulence if the assignments process also takes a 
closer look at the qualifications of the Marine and includes schooling in the timeline prior 
to arrival at the battalion. This is a complicated suggestion that may be difficult to 
coordinate with availability of schools relative to the Marines transition time. Regardless, 
the finding is relevant to the discussion and may benefit the unit’s ability to stabilize 
sooner and achieve higher readiness. 
The results of the models used in this research suggest several statistically 
significant occupational specialties that should be prioritized in staffing to maximize 
readiness. Results show that resolving staffing gaps in 0369 GySgts, 0302 Lts, 0369 
SSgts, 0341 NCOs, 0331 E1-E3, 0341 E1-E3, and scout snipers have a statistically 
significant impact on readiness as defined in this research. These findings are based on 
data from 36 infantry battalions that participated in EMV from 2009–2012. Since the 
exercise has changed to ITX, it may benefit the Marine Corps to validate these categories 
relative to the new exercise standards. Finally, a notable finding is the lack of 
significance of staffing the infantry NCO in determining readiness. This finding is 
discussed in detail in chapter 4 and further research is required to determine causality in 
this case. 
C. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The Marine Corps can benefit in many ways from continuing to “torture the data” 
related to improving metrics used to determine the readiness of the force. This research 
provides evidence for several possible approaches such as: including a stability metric in 
measuring personnel readiness, adjusting the assignment window, prioritizing the staffing 
of statistically significant unit groups, and continuing the guidance provided in the 
Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing policy. These items only represent the tip of the iceberg 
of potential topics for further research on readiness. 
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An extension of this research includes an expansion of the unit group model to 
include more specific categories for support MOS categories. This research intentionally 
targeted the infantry MOSs to determine the statistically significant combat arms 
specialties within an infantry battalion. However, several support MOSs are likely to be 
statistically significant once they are disaggregated from their functional groups. Of 
particular interest would be the identification of low density high demand MOSs within 
the support functions in an infantry battalion. 
This research used exercise data from infantry battalion performance at EMV to 
represent the dependent variable. In doing this, the research excluded the primary forward 
deployed MAGTFs used by the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps can benefit from a 
similar study focused on the readiness of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), 
specifically Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs), through the performance of those units 
during the certification exercise evaluated by Special Operations Training Group 
(SOTG). These infantry battalions are evaluated on their ability to execute mission 
profiles according to a different set of assigned missions. The results of a study on MEUs 
could be used as a comparative assessment with the infantry battalions used in this 
research. 
The data also show apparently significantly overstaffed MOSs within the infantry 
battalions in the study. This finding was unexpected, and the researcher’s inability to 
remove the non-deployable Marines from the data skewed the results to some extent. It 
became apparent through the course of the research that this is an intentional practice by 
the Marine Corps to maximize readiness at all times rather than in relation to a particular 
deployment. What is unknown from this research is the impact that policy has on the 
stability, cohesion, and readiness of the battalion. Further research is recommended to 
determine the effect of carrying non-deployable Marines relative to readiness. 
The final topic recommended for further research relates to the cost of 
maintaining an “expeditionary force in readiness” (CMC, 2015). Maintaining a force that 
is always ready comes at significant monetary cost to the nation. Many would argue, and 
this research would agree, that the nation should pay any cost to protect its vital interests 
and the Marine Corps is a critical element to that strategy. However, the question of 
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tiered readiness suggested by George (1999) and McCarroll (2012) provide an interesting 




APPENDIX. READINESS REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS 
A. UNIT GROUP MODEL RESULTS 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 1 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0357*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0296*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0330*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0536*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion Unit Groups 
_Iunit_grou_1 Cmd -0.0011 
    [0.0035] 
_Iunit_grou_2 Intel -0.0070 
    [0.0049] 
_Iunit_grou_3 Inf_Capts -0.0004 
    [0.0036] 
_Iunit_grou_4 Inf_MSgts 0.0010 
    [0.0038] 
_Iunit_grou_5 Inf_GySgts 0.0110** 
    [0.0050] 
_Iunit_grou_6 Inf_Lts -0.0103** 
    [0.0044] 
_Iunit_grou_7 Inf_SSgts -0.0112** 
    [0.0048] 
_Iunit_grou_8 Inf_NCO 0.0005 
    [0.0036] 
_Iunit_grou_9 MG_NCO -0.0043 
    [0.0036] 
_Iunit_grou_10 Mortar_NCO -0.0070* 
    [0.0038] 
_Iunit_grou_11 Assault_NCO -0.0011 
    [0.0035] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 1 
    [0.0035] 
_Iunit_grou_13 Infantry 0.0035 
    [0.0049] 
_Iunit_grou_14 MG -0.0102** 
    [0.0043] 
_Iunit_grou_15 Mortar -0.0126*** 
    [0.0043] 
_Iunit_grou_16 Assault -0.0024 
    [0.0040] 
_Iunit_grou_17 Missile -0.0007 
    [0.0037] 
_Iunit_grou_18 SSP -0.0104 
    [0.0068] 
_Iunit_grou_19 TACP -0.0013 
    [0.0035] 
_Iunit_grou_20 Admin 0.0019 
    [0.0048] 
_Iunit_grou_21 Logistics 0.0053 
    [0.0056] 
_Iunit_grou_22 Comm -0.0043 
    [0.0041] 
_Iunit_grou_23 CBRN -0.0015 
    [0.0037] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0005 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_IuniXASRg_1 (unit_group==1)*ASRgap 0.0009 
    [0.0021] 
_IuniXASRg_2 (unit_group==2)*ASRgap -0.0022 
    [0.0013] 
_IuniXASRg_3 (unit_group==3)*ASRgap -0.0012 
    [0.0013] 
_IuniXASRg_4 (unit_group==4)*ASRgap -0.0107*** 
    [0.0042] 
_IuniXASRg_5 (unit_group==5)*ASRgap -0.0033*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IuniXASRg_6 (unit_group==6)*ASRgap 0.0024** 
    [0.0012] 
_IuniXASRg_7 (unit_group==7)*ASRgap 0.0012 
    [0.0010] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 1 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_9 (unit_group==9)*ASRgap -0.0015* 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_10 (unit_group==10)*ASRgap -0.0015 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_11 (unit_group==11)*ASRgap -0.0013 
    [0.0010] 
_IuniXASRg_12 (unit_group==12)*ASRgap -0.0003 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_13 (unit_group==13)*ASRgap -0.0005 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_14 (unit_group==14)*ASRgap 0.0001 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_15 (unit_group==15)*ASRgap 0.0001 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_16 (unit_group==16)*ASRgap -0.0003 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_17 (unit_group==17)*ASRgap -0.0004 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_18 (unit_group==18)*ASRgap -0.0012 
    [0.0010] 
_IuniXASRg_19 (unit_group==19)*ASRgap -0.0001 
    [0.0024] 
_IuniXASRg_20 (unit_group==20)*ASRgap 0.0010 
    [0.0018] 
_IuniXASRg_21 (unit_group==21)*ASRgap -0.0009 
    [0.0010] 
_IuniXASRg_22 (unit_group==22)*ASRgap -0.0000 
    [0.0009] 
_IuniXASRg_23 (unit_group==23)*ASRgap 0.0021 
    [0.0029] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
stable stable -0.0054** 
    [0.0023] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_2 (tmonth==-5)*stable -0.0001 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_3 (tmonth==-4)*stable 0.0014 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_4 (tmonth==-3)*stable 0.0024 
    [0.0021] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 1 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_6 (tmonth==-1)*stable 0.0050** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0066*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0079*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0081*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0087*** 
    [0.0021] 
Constant 0.7603*** 
    [0.0033] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.320 
Adjusted R^2 0.315 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
B. MOS GROUP MODEL RESULTS 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 2 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0356*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0288*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0324*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0532*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion MOS Groups 
_Imos_group_1 Cmd Group -0.0010 
    [0.0035] 
_Imos_group_2 Intel -0.0062 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 2 
_Imos_group_3 0302 -0.0022 
    [0.0035] 
_Imos_group_4 0369 -0.0002 
    [0.0034] 
_Imos_group_5 0311 0.0016 
    [0.0035] 
_Imos_group_6 0331 -0.0013 
    [0.0033] 
_Imos_group_7 0341 -0.0022 
    [0.0033] 
_Imos_group_8 0351 -0.0012 
    [0.0033] 
_Imos_group_9 0352 -0.0012 
    [0.0033] 
_Imos_group_10 SSP -0.0138** 
    [0.0068] 
_Imos_group_11 TACP -0.0002 
    [0.0036] 
_Imos_group_12 Admin 0.0039 
    [0.0049] 
_Imos_group_13 Logistics 0.0078 
    [0.0056] 
_Imos_group_14 Comm -0.0020 
    [0.0041] 
_Imos_group_15 CBRN 0.0008 
    [0.0037] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0014 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_ImosXASRg_1 (mos_group==1)*ASRgap 0.0024 
    [0.0021] 
_ImosXASRg_2 (mos_group==2)*ASRgap -0.0020 
    [0.0013] 
_ImosXASRg_3 (mos_group==3)*ASRgap 0.0001 
    [0.0010] 
_ImosXASRg_4 (mos_group==4)*ASRgap -0.0010 
    [0.0010] 
_ImosXASRg_5 (mos_group==5)*ASRgap -0.0014 
    [0.0009] 
_ImosXASRg_6 (mos_group==6)*ASRgap -0.0012 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 2 
_ImosXASRg_7 (mos_group==7)*ASRgap -0.0012 
    [0.0009] 
_ImosXASRg_8 (mos_group==8)*ASRgap -0.0012 
    [0.0009] 
_ImosXASRg_9 (mos_group==9)*ASRgap -0.0010 
    [0.0009] 
_ImosXASRg_10 (mos_group==10)*ASRgap -0.0021** 
    [0.0010] 
_ImosXASRg_11 (mos_group==11)*ASRgap 0.0015 
    [0.0024] 
_ImosXASRg_12 (mos_group==12)*ASRgap 0.0021 
    [0.0018] 
_ImosXASRg_13 (mos_group==13)*ASRgap -0.0018* 
    [0.0010] 
_ImosXASRg_14 (mos_group==14)*ASRgap -0.0009 
    [0.0009] 
_ImosXASRg_15 (mos_group==15)*ASRgap 0.0017 
    [0.0029] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
stable stable -0.0122*** 
    [0.0021] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_2 (tmonth==-5)*stable 0.0000 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_3 (tmonth==-4)*stable 0.0015 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_4 (tmonth==-3)*stable 0.0025 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0046** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_6 (tmonth==-1)*stable 0.0050** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0065*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0078*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0079*** 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0086*** 
    [0.0022] 
Constant 0.7639*** 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 2 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.312 
Adjusted R^2 0.308 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
C. LEADERSHIP GROUP MODEL RESULTS 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 3 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0359*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0289*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0324*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0532*** 
    [0.0013] 
Battalion Leadership Groups 
_Ilead_grou_1 Cmd Group -0.0011 
    [0.0035] 
_Ilead_grou_2 Intel -0.0066 
    [0.0049] 
_Ilead_grou_3 Co_staff 0.0009 
    [0.0033] 
_Ilead_grou_4 Plt_staff -0.0083** 
    [0.0038] 
_Ilead_grou_5 Inf_NCO -0.0011 
    [0.0031] 
_Ilead_grou_6 Infantry -0.0005 
    [0.0032] 
_Ilead_grou_7 SSP -0.0109 
    [0.0068] 
_Ilead_grou_8 TACP -0.0010 
    [0.0036] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 3 
    [0.0049] 
_Ilead_grou_10 Logistics 0.0058 
    [0.0056] 
_Ilead_grou_11 Comm -0.0036 
    [0.0041] 
_Ilead_grou_12 CBRN -0.0009 
    [0.0037] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0007 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_IleaXASRg_1 (lead_group==1)*ASRgap 0.0013 
    [0.0021] 
_IleaXASRg_2 (lead_group==2)*ASRgap -0.0021 
    [0.0013] 
_IleaXASRg_3 (lead_group==3)*ASRgap -0.0016 
    [0.0010] 
_IleaXASRg_4 (lead_group==4)*ASRgap 0.0010 
    [0.0010] 
_IleaXASRg_5 (lead_group==5)*ASRgap -0.0009 
    [0.0009] 
_IleaXASRg_6 (lead_group==6)*ASRgap -0.0007 
    [0.0009] 
_IleaXASRg_7 (lead_group==7)*ASRgap -0.0015 
    [0.0010] 
_IleaXASRg_8 (lead_group==8)*ASRgap 0.0004 
    [0.0024] 
_IleaXASRg_9 (lead_group==9)*ASRgap 0.0014 
    [0.0018] 
_IleaXASRg_10 (lead_group==10)*ASRgap -0.0011 
    [0.0010] 
_IleaXASRg_11 (lead_group==11)*ASRgap -0.0003 
    [0.0009] 
_IleaXASRg_12 (lead_group==12)*ASRgap 0.0020 
    [0.0029] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
stable stable -0.0073*** 
    [0.0021] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_2 (tmonth==-5)*stable 0.0000 
    [0.0021] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 3 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_4 (tmonth==-3)*stable 0.0025 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0047** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_6 (tmonth==-1)*stable 0.0051** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0065*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0078*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0078*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0085*** 
    [0.0022] 
Constant 0.7608*** 
    [0.0032] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.313 
Adjusted R^2 0.310 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
D. FUNCTIONAL GROUP MODEL RESULTS 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 4 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0357*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0285*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0320*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0530*** 
    [0.0013] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 4 
_Ifxn_group_1 Cmd Group -0.0011 
    [0.0035] 
_Ifxn_group_2 Intel -0.0065 
    [0.0049] 
_Ifxn_group_3 Infantry -0.0006 
    [0.0030] 
_Ifxn_group_4 TACP -0.0009 
    [0.0036] 
_Ifxn_group_5 Admin 0.0028 
    [0.0049] 
_Ifxn_group_6 Logistics 0.0061 
    [0.0056] 
_Ifxn_group_7 Comm -0.0034 
    [0.0041] 
_Ifxn_group_8 CBRN -0.0007 
    [0.0037] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0008 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_IfxnXASRga_1 (fxn_group==1)*ASRgap 0.0015 
    [0.0020] 
_IfxnXASRga_2 (fxn_group==2)*ASRgap -0.0021 
    [0.0014] 
_IfxnXASRga_3 (fxn_group==3)*ASRgap -0.0008 
    [0.0009] 
_IfxnXASRga_4 (fxn_group==4)*ASRgap 0.0005 
    [0.0024] 
_IfxnXASRga_5 (fxn_group==5)*ASRgap 0.0015 
    [0.0018] 
_IfxnXASRga_6 (fxn_group==6)*ASRgap -0.0012 
    [0.0010] 
_IfxnXASRga_7 (fxn_group==7)*ASRgap -0.0004 
    [0.0009] 
_IfxnXASRga_8 (fxn_group==8)*ASRgap 0.0020 
    [0.0029] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
stable stable -0.0078*** 
    [0.0019] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_2 (tmonth==-5)*stable -0.0000 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 4 
_ItmoXstab_3 (tmonth==-4)*stable 0.0015 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_4 (tmonth==-3)*stable 0.0025 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0047** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_6 (tmonth==-1)*stable 0.0050** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0064*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0076*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0076*** 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0084*** 
    [0.0022] 
Constant 0.7610*** 
    [0.0032] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.309 
Adjusted R^2 0.307 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
E. WARFIGHTING FUNCTION MODEL RESULTS 
  
(1) 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 5 
Dependent Variable 
_totalScore Battalion EMV score   
Independent Variables 
Relationship to 2011 
pre2011 pre2011 0.0358*** 
    [0.0008] 
Home Station Base Codes 
_IBASEcode_2 Lejeune -0.0285*** 
    [0.0011] 
_IBASEcode_3 Kaneohe -0.0319*** 
    [0.0013] 
_IBASEcode_4 29 Palms -0.0529*** 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 5 
Battalion Warfighting Function Groups 
_Iwff_group_1 C2 -0.0020 
    [0.0034] 
_Iwff_group_2 Intel -0.0066 
    [0.0049] 
_Iwff_group_3 Maneuver -0.0007 
    [0.0030] 
_Iwff_group_4 Fires -0.0010 
    [0.0036] 
_Iwff_group_5 Logistics -0.0010 
    [0.0034] 
_Iwff_group_6 FPRO -0.0009 
    [0.0037] 
Difference Between On-Board and ASR 
ASRgap ASRgap 0.0007 
    [0.0009] 
Interaction Terms 
_IwffXASRga_1 (wff_group==1)*ASRgap -0.0004 
    [0.0009] 
_IwffXASRga_2 (wff_group==2)*ASRgap -0.0021 
    [0.0014] 
_IwffXASRga_3 (wff_group==3)*ASRgap -0.0007 
    [0.0009] 
_IwffXASRga_4 (wff_group==4)*ASRgap 0.0004 
    [0.0024] 
_IwffXASRga_5 (wff_group==5)*ASRgap -0.0007 
    [0.0009] 
_IwffXASRga_6 (wff_group==6)*ASRgap 0.0021 
    [0.0029] 
Personnel Strength defined as 90% of ASR 
stable stable -0.0072*** 
    [0.0018] 
Interaction Terms 
_ItmoXstab_2 (tmonth==-5)*stable -0.0001 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_3 (tmonth==-4)*stable 0.0014 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_4 (tmonth==-3)*stable 0.0024 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_5 (tmonth==-2)*stable 0.0046** 
    [0.0021] 




VARIABLES LABELS Model 5 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_7 (tmonth==0)*stable 0.0063*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_8 (tmonth==1)*stable 0.0075*** 
    [0.0021] 
_ItmoXstab_9 (tmonth==2)*stable 0.0076*** 
    [0.0022] 
_ItmoXstab_10 (tmonth==3)*stable 0.0084*** 
    [0.0022] 
Constant 0.7606*** 
    [0.0032] 
Observations 8,597 
R-squared 0.309 
Adjusted R^2 0.307 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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